Social Epistemology

Social Epistemology

Volumn , Issue , 2011, Pages 1-368

  Haddock, Adrian ^a   Millar, Alan ^a   Pritchard, Duncan ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF STIRLING   (United Kingdom)

^b UNIVERSITY OF EDINBURGH   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Comprehension; Disagreement; Epistemological concerns; Knowledge; Naturalist epistemologists; Social interaction; Testimony

Indexed keywords

EID: 79960513812     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199577477.001.0001     Document Type: Book

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