Evidentialism: Essays in Epistemology

Evidentialism: Essays in Epistemology

Volumn , Issue , 2004, Pages 1-330

  Conee, Earl ^a   Feldman, Richard ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ROCHESTER   (United States)

Author keywords

Evidence; Externalism; Internalism; Justification; Knowledge; Reliabilism; Skepticism

Indexed keywords

EID: 84922265051     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1093/0199253722.001.0001     Document Type: Book

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