Relying on Others: An Essay in Epistemology

Relying on Others: An Essay in Epistemology

Volumn , Issue , 2010, Pages 1-240

  Goldberg, Sanford C ^a  

^a NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Coverage; Knowledge; Media coverage; Reliabilism; Social epistemology; Testimony

Indexed keywords

EID: 79960239368     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199593248.001.0001     Document Type: Book

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