The Nature of Normativity

The Nature of Normativity

Volumn , Issue , 2008, Pages 1-320

  Wedgwood, Ralph ^a  

^a MERTON COLLEGE   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Epistemology; Intentionality; Metanormative realism; Metaphysics; Normative thought; Normativity of the intentional; Semantics

Indexed keywords

EID: 84921997148     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199251315.001.0001     Document Type: Book

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