The Case for Contextualism: Knowledge, Skepticism, and Context, Vol. 1

The Case for Contextualism: Knowledge, Skepticism, and Context, Vol. 1

Volumn , Issue , 2009, Pages 1-304

  DeRose, Keith ^a  

^a YALE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Assertion; Classical Invariantism; Contextualism; Disagreement; Intellectualism; Invariantism; Knowledge; Skepticism; Subject Sensitive Invariantism; Warranted Assertability

Indexed keywords

EID: 79551598985     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199564460.001.0001     Document Type: Book

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