The Nature and Value of Knowledge: Three Investigations

The Nature and Value of Knowledge: Three Investigations

Volumn , Issue , 2010, Pages 1-286

  Pritchard, Duncan ^a   Millar, Alan ^b   Haddock, Adrian ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF EDINBURGH   (United Kingdom)

^b UNIVERSITY OF STIRLING   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Epistemic luck; Epistemic value; Epistemology; Final value; Intentional action; Knowledge; Recognitional abilities; Second order knowledge; Understanding; Value of knowledge

Indexed keywords

EID: 84921597109     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199586264.001.0001     Document Type: Book

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