Attitudes toward epistemic risk and the value of experiments

Studia Logica

Volumn 86, Issue 2, 2007, Pages 215-246

  Fallis, Don ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA   (United States)

Author keywords

Bayesianism; Categorical belief; Degrees of belief; Epistemic risk; Epistemic utility; Proper scoring rule; Scientific experiment

Indexed keywords

EID: 34547497554     PISSN: 00393215     EISSN: 15728730     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11225-007-9060-y     Document Type: Article

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