Problems of sincerity

Proceedings of the Aristotelean Society

Volumn 105, Issue 1, 2005, Pages 325-345

  Moran, Richard ^a  

^a HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

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[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 60949338097     PISSN: 00667374     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.0066-7373.2004.00117.x     Document Type: Article

References (7)

1. Plotinus, Enneades. Trans. Stephen Mackenna (London, 1956), IV. 3, 18
2. Williamson, Knowledge and its Limits (Oxford University Press, 2000)
3. 'Many crucial facts lie beyond the time and place of interaction or lie concealed within it. For example, the "true" or "real" attitudes, beliefs, and emotions of the individual can be ascertained only indirectly, through his avowals or through what appears to be involuntary expressive behaviour . . . The expressiveness of the individual (and therefore his capacity to give impressions) appears to involve two radically different kinds of sign activity: the expression that he gives, and the expression that he gives off.' Erving Goffman, The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life (Doubleday, 1959), p. 2
4. 'Man lügt wohl mit dem Munde, aber mit dem Maule, das man dabei macht, sagt man doch noch die Wahrheit'. Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, §166
5. 'Below the surface-stream, shallow and light, Of what we say we feel - below the stream, As light, of what we think we feel - there flows With noiseless current strong, obscure and deep, The central stream of what we feel indeed.' Quoted in Lionel Trilling, Sincerity and Authenticity (Harvard University Press, 1971), p. 6
6. Mellor uses the term 'assent' for second-order belief, believing that one believes, and says 'Sincere assertion is saying what one assents to, that is what one believes one believes, not just what one believes.' p. 97, in 'Conscious Belief', Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (1977-8), pp. 87-101
7. The account Mellor gives of assent in that paper has been superceded by the richer account he gives in 'Consciousness and Degrees of Belief', in Prospects for Pragmatism: Essays in Memory of F. P. Ramsey, edited by D. H. Mellor (Cambridge University Press, 1991)