Virtue and Right

Ethics

Volumn 113, Issue 4, 2003, Pages 810-834+929

  Johnson, Robert N ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0142157130     PISSN: 00141704     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1086/373952     Document Type: Review

References (64)

1. Rosalind Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 28; John McDowell, "Virtue and Reason," in Virtue Ethics, ed. Roger Crisp and Michael Slote (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 141-62. The seeds of the kind of theory that they espouse can be found (naturally) in Aristotle: "Actions are called just or temperate when they are the sort that a just or temperate person would [characteristically] do" (Nicomachean Ethics, trans. T. R. Irwin [Indianapolis: Hackett, 1993], 1105b6).
2. Rosalind Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 28; John McDowell, "Virtue and Reason," in Virtue Ethics, ed. Roger Crisp and Michael Slote (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 141-62. The seeds of the kind of theory that they espouse can be found (naturally) in Aristotle: "Actions are called just or temperate when they are the sort that a just or temperate person would [characteristically] do" (Nicomachean Ethics, trans. T. R. Irwin [Indianapolis: Hackett, 1993], 1105b6).
3. Rosalind Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 28; John McDowell, "Virtue and Reason," in Virtue Ethics, ed. Roger Crisp and Michael Slote (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 141-62. The seeds of the kind of theory that they espouse can be found (naturally) in Aristotle: "Actions are called just or temperate when they are the sort that a just or temperate person would [characteristically] do" (Nicomachean Ethics, trans. T. R. Irwin [Indianapolis: Hackett, 1993], 1105b6).
4. Michael Slote, "Agent-Based Virtue Ethics," in Crisp and Slote, eds., pp. 239-62, pp. 239-41, and Morals from Motives (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 3-37; Christine Swanton, "A Virtue Ethical Account of Right Action," Ethics 112 (2001): 32-52.
5. Michael Slote, "Agent-Based Virtue Ethics," in Crisp and Slote, eds., pp. 239-62, pp. 239-41, and Morals from Motives (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 3-37; Christine Swanton, "A Virtue Ethical Account of Right Action," Ethics 112 (2001): 32-52.
6. Michael Slote, "Agent-Based Virtue Ethics," in Crisp and Slote, eds., pp. 239-62, pp. 239-41, and Morals from Motives (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 3-37; Christine Swanton, "A Virtue Ethical Account of Right Action," Ethics 112 (2001): 32-52.
7. Swanton, p. 32.
8. Bernard Williams, though not a virtue theorist himself, argues this in his Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1985), pp. 140-45; see also Elizabeth Anscombe, "Modern Moral Philosophy," in Crisp and Slote, eds., pp. 26-44, pp. 37-40; and McDowell, pp. 147-54.
9. Bernard Williams, though not a virtue theorist himself, argues this in his Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1985), pp. 140-45; see also Elizabeth Anscombe, "Modern Moral Philosophy," in Crisp and Slote, eds., pp. 26-44, pp. 37-40; and McDowell, pp. 147-54.
10. Bernard Williams, though not a virtue theorist himself, argues this in his Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1985), pp. 140-45; see also Elizabeth Anscombe, "Modern Moral Philosophy," in Crisp and Slote, eds., pp. 26-44, pp. 37-40; and McDowell, pp. 147-54.
11. Most prominently Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics; Slote, "Agent-Based Virtue Ethics"; and Swanton. For an alternative view, see Edmund Pincoffs, Quandaries and Virtues (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1986).
12. Most prominently Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics; Slote, "Agent-Based Virtue Ethics"; and Swanton. For an alternative view, see Edmund Pincoffs, Quandaries and Virtues (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1986).
13. Most prominently Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics; Slote, "Agent-Based Virtue Ethics"; and Swanton. For an alternative view, see Edmund Pincoffs, Quandaries and Virtues (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1986).
14. McDowell, p. 141.
15. Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics, p. 28, and her "Virtue Ethics and Abortion," in Crisp and Slote, eds., pp. 217-38.
16. Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics, p. 28, and her "Virtue Ethics and Abortion," in Crisp and Slote, eds., pp. 217-38.
17. For instance, McDowell, pp. 143-44; Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics, pp. 153-57.
18. For instance, McDowell, pp. 143-44; Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics, pp. 153-57.
19. See Roger Crisp and Michael Slote, "Introduction," in Crisp and Slote, eds., pp. 1-25, p. 21. Note that one may opt for a "threshold" interpretation of 'complete' such that one possesses a given virtue completely when one possesses it to a certain threshold, and one is completely virtuous when one possesses some core set of the virtues.
20. On the Aristotelian view, the ideal of complete virtue also includes many "intellectual" virtues. However, since it is dubious that complete moral virtue requires possession of literally all of the intellectual virtues, I will just assume that complete virtue that is humanly attainable requires no intellectual facility beyond what one must possess to be "practically wise."
21. Future novel circumstances brought about by, say, advances in genetics and information technology or changes in global weather patterns also motivate the construal of V as a hypothetical account concerning what a completely virtuous person would do if she were in the circumstances.
22. See Hursthouse's illuminating discussion of dilemmas in chap. 3 of On Virtue Ethics.
23. Aristotle apparently construes his account of virtuous action in this way (Nicomachean Ethics, 1105b6-7). Linda Zagzebski holds that the right action is one that a completely virtuous person might or could, rather than would, do. But, as I point out in my discussion of Slote's view, we need a sense of 'right' that encompasses not only mere permissibility but also what is obligatory or at least "best." See her Virtues of the Mind: An Inquiry into the Nature of Virtue and the Ethical Foundations of Knowledge (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 233-35.
24. Aristotle apparently construes his account of virtuous action in this way (Nicomachean Ethics, 1105b6-7). Linda Zagzebski holds that the right action is one that a completely virtuous person might or could, rather than would, do. But, as I point out in my discussion of Slote's view, we need a sense of 'right' that encompasses not only mere permissibility but also what is obligatory or at least "best." See her Virtues of the Mind: An Inquiry into the Nature of Virtue and the Ethical Foundations of Knowledge (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 233-35.
25. Indeed, Slote does say it (in "Agent-Based Virtue Ethics," pp. 241-43), though he holds that right actions are those that actually arise from valuable motives.
26. Naturally, one may want to impose limits on any theory of right to the effect that it should not make it impossible or even unlikely that we could come to know what the right thing to do is.
27. See Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics, pp. 28-29.
28. Aristotle himself, e.g., explicitly allows for variations, based on one's social situation. See the discussion at 1260a4-1260b7, in his Politics, trans. B. Jowett, in The Complete Works of Aristotle: The Revised Translation, ed. Jonathan Barnes (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984), pp. 1986-2129. For instance, "So it must be with excellences of character generally also; all should partake of them, but only in such manner and degree as is required by each for the fulfillment of his function" (1260a14-15).
29. But there are skeptics, e.g., Gilbert Harman ("Moral Philosophy Meets Social Psychology: Virtue Ethics and the Fundamental Attribution Error," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 99 [Oxford: Blackwell, 1999], pp. 315-31) and John M. Doris ("Persons, Situations, and Virtue Ethics," Noûs 32 [1998]: 504-30).
30. But there are skeptics, e.g., Gilbert Harman ("Moral Philosophy Meets Social Psychology: Virtue Ethics and the Fundamental Attribution Error," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 99 [Oxford: Blackwell, 1999], pp. 315-31) and John M. Doris ("Persons, Situations, and Virtue Ethics," Noûs 32 [1998]: 504-30).
31. See Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1114a1-1114b25. This, I take it, is part of the point of Williams's reply to McDowell in his "Replies" in World, Mind, and Ethics, ed. J. E. J. Altham and Ross Harrison (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp. 190 ff.
32. See Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1114a1-1114b25. This, I take it, is part of the point of Williams's reply to McDowell in his "Replies" in World, Mind, and Ethics, ed. J. E. J. Altham and Ross Harrison (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp. 190 ff.
33. Some might see this and the following two examples as simply instances of what Robert Shope calls the "conditional fallacy." (See his "The Conditional Fallacy in Contemporary Philosophy," Journal of Philosophy 75 [1978]: 397-413; see also Robert N. Johnson, "Internal Reasons and the Conditional Fallacy," Philosophical Quarterly 49 [1999]: 53-71.) But since, as I argue below, Slote and Swanton's views, which are not conditional analyses, also do not account for these cases, the difficulty cannot simply be that a proponent of V commits the conditional fallacy.
34. Some might see this and the following two examples as simply instances of what Robert Shope calls the "conditional fallacy." (See his "The Conditional Fallacy in Contemporary Philosophy," Journal of Philosophy 75 [1978]: 397-413; see also Robert N. Johnson, "Internal Reasons and the Conditional Fallacy," Philosophical Quarterly 49 [1999]: 53-71.) But since, as I argue below, Slote and Swanton's views, which are not conditional analyses, also do not account for these cases, the difficulty cannot simply be that a proponent of V commits the conditional fallacy.
35. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1103a25.
36. Ibid., 1103b21.
37. Ibid., 1103b1.
38. See Howard Curzer's excellent discussion of some problems with these views in "Aristotle's Bad Advice about Becoming Good," Philosophy 71 (1996): 139-46.
39. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1109a20-1109b20.
40. Ibid., 1109b7-1109b12.
41. Also, passages from the Politics, 1260a20-1260b7, 1340b10-19, and 1342a5-1342b33, reflect Aristotle's awareness that how one improves character depends on the state of one's character here and now and so is not simply developed by "acting as the fully virtuous characteristically acts."
42. I think that it can: if we interpret 'similar' as "similar to the actions the state itself produces," we get the problematic conclusion. Also, if we take "state" as disposition to action and assume that an action is similar to a state just in case it is similar to the actions which characterize the disposition, that, too, leads to the problematic conclusion. But, if a state of virtue simply develops out of actions which are similar to each other, whether like the state and the actions it produces or not, that would not deliver the problematic conclusion. It would also, however, require seeing the categories of "just," "brave," and so forth, as they occur in the conclusion, as broad enough to include actions appropriate for the nonvirtuous, while denying that just, brave, and so forth, actions are only those characteristic of the just, brave, and so on, taken as "completed" virtues.
43. Williams, "Replies," p. 190. Thanks to David Sobel for pointing out the quote.
44. It is tempting to think that a continent person acts exactly as the temperate person acts, differing only "on the inside" by exerting an inner power unneeded by the temperate person. But this is not so. Of course, the actions of both are the same in being abstinent acts. But this similarity is superficial. When Aristotle claims that abstinence makes us temperate, while temperance makes us abstinent (Nicomachean Ethics, 1104b1), abstinent acts in the first case are continent acts while in the second they are temperate acts, though nevertheless the same in being abstinences from pleasure. Hence, temperance makes a person able to perform temperate acts which are abstinent, but not to perform any and all abstinent acts, in particular, abstinent acts that are continent. For instance, continence, unlike temperance, is often displayed in indirect strategies. The set of temperate acts thus carves out one subset of abstinent acts, and continent acts carve out another; this is why the pattern of continent actions is different from that of temperance. Conversely, even if actions producing temperance are acts of abstinence, not any and every abstinent action produces temperance. In particular, those characteristic only of the temperate may well not tend to produce temperance in one who needs self-control. In this crucial sense, continent actions are importantly different from temperate actions, namely, the sense in which continent actions produce the character trait of temperance in the novice, even though not all temperate actions - actions characteristic of a temperate person - do.
45. I myself am not convinced that there is such a thing as "moral blindness." I take it that virtue-oriented views, however, are committed to its existence. In any case, racism, sexism, or homophobia might be good candidates for moral blindness.
46. See, e.g., Iris Murdoch, The Sovereignty of Good (New York: Ark, 1985), pp. 16-23, 31-40.
47. Compare Hursthouse (On Virtue Ethics, pp. 35-37), who explicitly endorses the idea that seeking such guidance from the virtuous is what we ought to do in such situations, without noticing the implications of this for V.
48. I obviously draw here on the analogy with linguistic intuition in John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, rev. ed. (Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999), pp. 41 ff.
49. Naturally not always: a native speaker might use words - e.g., slang - in a circumstance in which the very same words coming out of the mouth of a beginner would sound ludicrous. See Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, pp. 142-45.
50. There are many other things a novice who lacks sensitivity can and should also do: take longer than may seem necessary to decide on his course of action, not rely on how things seem to be, try to stimulate his imagination, and use ever more of it when reviewing the facts. These also are not characteristic of virtuous persons, since they already use their imagination fully, and given that what is good is what appears good to the man of practical wisdom (Nicomachean Ethics, 1113a32-1113b2).
51. Thanks to Karen Jones for pointing this out to me. For a more detailed discussion of this and related points, see her "Second-Hand Moral Knowledge," Journal of Philosophy 96 (1999): 55-78.
52. Martha Nussbaum raised this possibility in written comments.
53. For an excellent discussion of Leibniz, the Cambridge Platonists, and other of the modern perfectionists, and their relationships to other modern ethical views, see J. B. Schneewind's The Invention of Autonomy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998).
54. For example, see Peter Railton, "Moral Realism," Philosophical Review 95 (1986): 163-207, p. 174. A person's good on his view is not what a fully informed version of that person would want for himself qua fully informed person, but what a fully informed version would want for his less informed self as he actually is. Hence, we should first construe ourselves as we would be were we in an ideal epistemic and desiderative state and ask what that person would want for ourselves as we are in our less ideal state, Naturally, a fully informed you might want many things for an uninformed you that he would not want for himself. For instance, he might want you to become better informed, something that he could not possibly want for himself.
55. Michael Smith, "Internal Reasons," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 55 (1995): 109-31, pp. 110-11.
56. I use the term 'holistic' here in Jonathan Dancy's sense in regard to reasons (see his Moral Reasons [Oxford: Blackwell, 1993], pp. 60-66), that is, "the behaviour of a reason (or of a consideration that serves as a reason) in a new case cannot be predicted from its behaviour elsewhere" (p. 60).
57. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1110a1-1115a1.
58. Of course, I myself am committed to the claim that actions appropriate only for the novice are right. Indeed, the vast diversity of stories about moral development result in a vast diversity of possible right actions on any theory. But developing an independent account of right, such as the standard consequentialist and deontological alternatives do, allows one to argue that developing a disposition to do right, however the messy details might go, is ceteris paribus obligatory because doing so expresses respect for humanity, is optimific, or whatever. A theory that begins with the history of a completely virtuous agent, on the other hand, must begin with those messy details themselves. Just getting the theory off the ground becomes a daunting task. By contrast, the indeterminacy of moral development is, on the standard theories, a problem for the application of the theory of right, not for its construction.
59. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1095a3.
60. Slote, "Agent-Based Virtue Ethics," p. 240.
61. Swanton, p. 39.
62. Ibid., pp. 46-49.
63. Hence, I take it, the target of a given virtue may not be the outcome that it characteristically produces.
64. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1106a15-1106b5.