Testimonial justification: Inferential or non-inferential?

Philosophical Quarterly

Volumn 56, Issue 222, 2006, Pages 84-95

  Graham, Peter J ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 35148866597     PISSN: 00318094     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9213.2005.00430.x     Document Type: Article

References (11)

1. For elaboration and important qualifications of (T), see my 'Liberal Fundamentalism and its Rivals', in J. Lackey and E. Sosa (eds), The Epistemology of Testimony (Oxford UP, forthcoming). Prima facie justification is defeasible justification. 'Pro tanto justification' means 'some' justification, justification that may fall short of on-balance justification
2. E. Fricker, 'Against Gullibility', in B.K. Matilal and A. Chakrabarti (eds), Knowing from Words (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1994), pp. 125-161
3. 'Telling and Trusting: Reductionism and Anti-Reductionism in the Epistemology of Testimony', Mind, 104 (1995), pp. 393-411
4. 'Testimony and Perception: Some Contrasts', presented to the Pacific APA, 1998
5. Fricker, 'Trusting Others in the Sciences: A Priori or Empirical Warrant?', Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science, 33 (2002), pp. 373-83
6. E. Fricker, 'The Epistemology of Testimony', Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 61 (1987), pp. 57-83
7. For some discussion of Fricker's view, see C. Insole, 'Seeing Off the Local Threat to Irreducible Knowledge by Testimony', The Philosophical Quarterly, 50 (2000), pp. 44-56
8. and M. Weiner, 'Accepting Testimony', The Philosophical Quarterly, 53 (2003), pp. 256-64
9. Jonathan Adler also seems to think, at least initially, that the presence of background support undermines the liberal view: 'The main criticism [of the liberal view] is for [its] underestimation of the availability and force of (background) empirical evidence': J. Adler, Belief's Own Ethics (MIT Press, 2002), p. 136
10. See R. Audi, The Good in the Right (Princeton UP, 2004), pp. 23-4
11. A. Casullo, 'Epistemic Over-determination and A Priori Justification', Philosophical Perspectives, 19 (2005)