Why we don't deserve credit for everything we know

Synthese

Volumn 158, Issue 3, 2007, Pages 345-361

  Lackey, Jennifer ^a  

^a NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Credit; Knowledge; Luck

Indexed keywords

EID: 34748885531     PISSN: 00397857     EISSN: 15730964     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11229-006-9044-x     Document Type: Article

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