Learning from Words: Testimony as a Source of Knowledge

Learning from Words: Testimony as a Source of Knowledge

Volumn , Issue , 2008, Pages 1-308

  Lackey, Jennifer ^a  

^a NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Belief; Dualism; Epistemology; Hearer; Knowledge; Reasons; Source of knowledge; Speaker; Testimony; Transmission

Indexed keywords

EID: 84921846547     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199219162.001.0001     Document Type: Book

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