The proper role for contextualism in an anti-luck epistemology

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Volumn 33, Issue SUPPL. 13, 1999, Pages 115-129

  Heller, Mark ^a  

^a SOUTHERN METHODIST UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 61949256341     PISSN: 00294624     EISSN: 14680068     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/0029-4624.33.s13.5     Document Type: Review

References (11)

1. David Lewis "Scorekeeping in a Language Game," Journal of Philosophical Logic (1979), 339-359.
2. "The Cone Model of Knowledge," Philosophical Topics (1986), 125-178.
3. See, for instance, "How to be a Fallibilist," Philosophical Perspectives (1988), 581-605.
4. "Contextualist Solutions to Epistemological Problems: Scepticism, Gettier, and the Lottery," Australasian Journal of Philosophy (1998), 289-306.
5. See Goldman, "Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge", in Pappas and Swain (eds.), Essays on Knowledge and Justification (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1978) , 120-145.
6. See Dretske, "Epistemic Operators", The Journal of Philosophy (1970), 1007-1023.
7. Lewis mentions the possibility of adopting this more inclusive sense of "closest" in "Ordering Semantics and Premise Semantics for Counterfactuals", Journal of Philosophical Logic (1981), 217-234.
8. For a few additional suggestive remarks about the relationship between reliabilism and the relevant alternatives theory, see my "The Simple Solution to the Problem of Generality" Noûs (1995), 501-515.
9. Epistemology and Cognition, 46-47 and 54-55.
10. "Elusive Knowledge".
11. "Contextualist Solutions to Epistemological Problems".