Fear of relativism?

Philosophical Studies

Volumn 141, Issue 3, 2008, Pages 379-390

  Wright, Crispin ^a,b  

^a NEW YORK UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF ST ANDREWS   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 57349162044     PISSN: 00318116     EISSN: 15730883     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11098-008-9280-7     Document Type: Article

References (27)

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3. P Boghossian 2007 The case against epistemic relativism: Replies to Rosen and Neta Episteme 4 49 65
4. Boghossian, P. Can we make sense of normative relativism? (unpublished ts).
5. Cappelen, H., & Hawthorne, J. (Forthcoming). Relativism: An essay in foundational semantics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
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14. MacFarlane, J. (2003 unpublished), Epistemic modalities and relative truth. MS available at http://sophos.berkeley.edu/macfarlane/epistmod.pdf.
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