Realist-expressivism: A neglected option for moral realism

Social Philosophy and Policy

Volumn 18, Issue 2, 2001, Pages 1-41

  Copp, David ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 0040623240     PISSN: 02650525     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/s0265052500002880     Document Type: Article

References (100)

1. Compare Geoffrey Sayre-McCord, "The Many Moral Realisms," in Geoffrey Sayre-McCord, ed., Essays on Moral Realism (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1988), 5.
2. Stephen Darwall calls this doctrine "judgment internalism" to distinguish it from other internalist doctrines. See Stephen Darwall, Impartial Reason (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983), 54-55. Philosophers sometimes propose weakened versions of internalism by specifying that, for instance, any rational person who believed she ought to do something would be relevantly motivated. For an example of this sort of account, see Michael Smith, The Moral Problem (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994), 61.
3. Stephen Darwall calls this doctrine "judgment internalism" to distinguish it from other internalist doctrines. See Stephen Darwall, Impartial Reason (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983), 54-55. Philosophers sometimes propose weakened versions of internalism by specifying that, for instance, any rational person who believed she ought to do something would be relevantly motivated. For an example of this sort of account, see Michael Smith, The Moral Problem (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994), 61.
4. Of course, it is committed to the first half. One subtlety that I need to ignore in this essay is that typical versions of antirealist-expressivism are committed to the second half of the view. Of course, no version is committed to the first (realist) half. Typical forms of antirealist-expressivism are internalist, but realist-expressivism is not (or need not be).
5. The precise location of the line between semantics and pragmatics is controversial. The basic idea, however, is that semantics is concerned with the literal meanings of terms, expressions, sentences, and the like, insofar as their meanings can be determined independently of the contexts in which they are used. Pragmatics is concerned with properties of expressions and the like that are determined by their use, or by the contexts in which they are used. For example, the fact that the sentence "I promise to meet you" can be used to make a promise is a feature of its semantics. However, the question of whether a person has made a promise in uttering the sentence in a given context is a question in pragmatics. General questions about what a context must be like in order for a person to make a promise in uttering the sentence, and questions about what is required in order to use the sentence sincerely to make a promise, are also questions in pragmatics. I am grateful to Steven Davis for help with this distinction.
6. See Simon Blackburn, "How to Be an Ethical Antirealist," Midwest Studies in Philosophy 12 (1988): 361-75. All subsequent references to this essay are to the version reprinted in Stephen Darwall, Allan Gibbard, and Peter Railton, eds., Moral Discourse and Practice: Some Philosophical Approaches (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 167-78. See also Simon Blackburn, Essays in Quasi-Realism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993). Allan Gibbard exhibits a temptation toward quasi-realism as well; see Allan Gibbard, Wise Choices, Apt Feelings (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990). For more on Gibbard's views, see Paul Horwich, "Gibbard's Theory of Norms," Philosophy and Public Affairs 22, no. 1 (1993): 61-78.
7. See Simon Blackburn, "How to Be an Ethical Antirealist," Midwest Studies in Philosophy 12 (1988): 361-75. All subsequent references to this essay are to the version reprinted in Stephen Darwall, Allan Gibbard, and Peter Railton, eds., Moral Discourse and Practice: Some Philosophical Approaches (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 167-78. See also Simon Blackburn, Essays in Quasi-Realism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993). Allan Gibbard exhibits a temptation toward quasi-realism as well; see Allan Gibbard, Wise Choices, Apt Feelings (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990). For more on Gibbard's views, see Paul Horwich, "Gibbard's Theory of Norms," Philosophy and Public Affairs 22, no. 1 (1993): 61-78.
8. See Simon Blackburn, "How to Be an Ethical Antirealist," Midwest Studies in Philosophy 12 (1988): 361-75. All subsequent references to this essay are to the version reprinted in Stephen Darwall, Allan Gibbard, and Peter Railton, eds., Moral Discourse and Practice: Some Philosophical Approaches (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 167-78. See also Simon Blackburn, Essays in Quasi-Realism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993). Allan Gibbard exhibits a temptation toward quasi-realism as well; see Allan Gibbard, Wise Choices, Apt Feelings (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990). For more on Gibbard's views, see Paul Horwich, "Gibbard's Theory of Norms," Philosophy and Public Affairs 22, no. 1 (1993): 61-78.
9. See Simon Blackburn, "How to Be an Ethical Antirealist," Midwest Studies in Philosophy 12 (1988): 361-75. All subsequent references to this essay are to the version reprinted in Stephen Darwall, Allan Gibbard, and Peter Railton, eds., Moral Discourse and Practice: Some Philosophical Approaches (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 167-78. See also Simon Blackburn, Essays in Quasi-Realism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993). Allan Gibbard exhibits a temptation toward quasi-realism as well; see Allan Gibbard, Wise Choices, Apt Feelings (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990). For more on Gibbard's views, see Paul Horwich, "Gibbard's Theory of Norms," Philosophy and Public Affairs 22, no. 1 (1993): 61-78.
10. See Simon Blackburn, "How to Be an Ethical Antirealist," Midwest Studies in Philosophy 12 (1988): 361-75. All subsequent references to this essay are to the version reprinted in Stephen Darwall, Allan Gibbard, and Peter Railton, eds., Moral Discourse and Practice: Some Philosophical Approaches (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 167-78. See also Simon Blackburn, Essays in Quasi-Realism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993). Allan Gibbard exhibits a temptation toward quasi-realism as well; see Allan Gibbard, Wise Choices, Apt Feelings (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990). For more on Gibbard's views, see Paul Horwich, "Gibbard's Theory of Norms," Philosophy and Public Affairs 22, no. 1 (1993): 61-78.
11. A deflationist about the term "property" might hold that to say there is a property of rightness is simply to affirm that some things are right. A deflationist about "belief" might hold that to say that a person believes that some things are right is simply to say that the person is disposed to affirm sentences to the effect that some things are right. On views of this kind, an antirealist-expressivist obviously can affirm, consistently, that there is a property of moral rightness and that there are beliefs about the rightness of actions; to affirm these claims would simply be to affirm that some things are right and that some people are disposed to affirm sentences to the effect that some actions are right.
12. As noted in the text, the problem I am addressing is how to distinguish between moral realism and antirealist-expressivism, given a deflationist account of the meaning of "true." Hartry Field has proposed that the distinction is best drawn in terms of the idea of an "objectively correct" norm. See Hartry Field, "Disquotational Truth and Factually Defective Discourse," Philosophical Review 103, no. 3 (1994): 440-41. am proposing that the distinction can be drawn in terms of the semantic role of ordinary nonmoral predicates and the idea of a "robust property," which is in turn explained in terms of the metaphysical status of the referents of ordinary predicate terms. The issues raised by questions about this metaphysical status go beyond the scope of this essay. The vagueness in what I am proposing is due in part to the fact that, as Michael Devitt has stressed, a formulation of the debate between moral realism and antirealist-expressivism ought to be independent of general metaphysical issues about the nature of properties. Among other things, such a formulation ought to allow for a nominalist understanding of talk of "properties," even though a nominalist would deny that there are any "properties" at all under some understandings of what this would mean. This is why I speak above of "the metaphysical status of the referents of ordinary predicate terms," and it is why, in the text, T speak of the "semantic role" of such predicate terms. I am attempting to be neutral among various accounts of these matters. See Michael Devitt, Realism and Truth, 2d ed. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997), 302-20, esp. 316-18.
13. As noted in the text, the problem I am addressing is how to distinguish between moral realism and antirealist-expressivism, given a deflationist account of the meaning of "true." Hartry Field has proposed that the distinction is best drawn in terms of the idea of an "objectively correct" norm. See Hartry Field, "Disquotational Truth and Factually Defective Discourse," Philosophical Review 103, no. 3 (1994): 440-41. am proposing that the distinction can be drawn in terms of the semantic role of ordinary nonmoral predicates and the idea of a "robust property," which is in turn explained in terms of the metaphysical status of the referents of ordinary predicate terms. The issues raised by questions about this metaphysical status go beyond the scope of this essay. The vagueness in what I am proposing is due in part to the fact that, as Michael Devitt has stressed, a formulation of the debate between moral realism and antirealist-expressivism ought to be independent of general metaphysical issues about the nature of properties. Among other things, such a formulation ought to allow for a nominalist understanding of talk of "properties," even though a nominalist would deny that there are any "properties" at all under some understandings of what this would mean. This is why I speak above of "the metaphysical status of the referents of ordinary predicate terms," and it is why, in the text, T speak of the "semantic role" of such predicate terms. I am attempting to be neutral among various accounts of these matters. See Michael Devitt, Realism and Truth, 2d ed. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997), 302-20, esp. 316-18.
14. A "basic" moral proposition is a proposition that entails, for some moral property M, that something instantiates M. An example is the proposition that capital punishment is wrong. Among nonbasic moral propositions are propositions such as that nothing is morally wrong and that either abortion is wrong or 2 + 2 = 4.
15. The classic sources of speech-act theory are J. L. Austin, How to Do Things with Words (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1962); and John Searle, Speech Acts (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969). For helpful discussion, see Kent Bach and Robert M. Harnish, Linguistic Communication and Speech Acts (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1979); and Steven Davis, Philosophy and Language (Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs-Merrill, 1976), 16-27.
16. The classic sources of speech-act theory are J. L. Austin, How to Do Things with Words (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1962); and John Searle, Speech Acts (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969). For helpful discussion, see Kent Bach and Robert M. Harnish, Linguistic Communication and Speech Acts (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1979); and Steven Davis, Philosophy and Language (Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs-Merrill, 1976), 16-27.
17. The classic sources of speech-act theory are J. L. Austin, How to Do Things with Words (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1962); and John Searle, Speech Acts (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969). For helpful discussion, see Kent Bach and Robert M. Harnish, Linguistic Communication and Speech Acts (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1979); and Steven Davis, Philosophy and Language (Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs-Merrill, 1976), 16-27.
18. The classic sources of speech-act theory are J. L. Austin, How to Do Things with Words (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1962); and John Searle, Speech Acts (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969). For helpful discussion, see Kent Bach and Robert M. Harnish, Linguistic Communication and Speech Acts (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1979); and Steven Davis, Philosophy and Language (Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs-Merrill, 1976), 16-27.
19. Charles Stevenson, "The Emotive Meaning of Ethical Terms," Mind 46, no. 181 (1937): 14-37 (all subsequent references to this essay are to the version reprinted in Darwall, Gibbard, and Railton, eds., Moral Discourse and Practice, 71-82); A. J. Ayer, Language, Truth, and Logic, 2d ed. (New York: Dover Publications, 1952), 108; R. M. Hare, The Language of Morals (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1952), 1-5; Blackburn, "How to Be an Ethical Antirealist"; Gibbard, Wise Choices, Apt Feelings.
20. Charles Stevenson, "The Emotive Meaning of Ethical Terms," Mind 46, no. 181 (1937): 14-37 (all subsequent references to this essay are to the version reprinted in Darwall, Gibbard, and Railton, eds., Moral Discourse and Practice, 71-82); A. J. Ayer, Language, Truth, and Logic, 2d ed. (New York: Dover Publications, 1952), 108; R. M. Hare, The Language of Morals (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1952), 1-5; Blackburn, "How to Be an Ethical Antirealist"; Gibbard, Wise Choices, Apt Feelings.
21. Charles Stevenson, "The Emotive Meaning of Ethical Terms," Mind 46, no. 181 (1937): 14-37 (all subsequent references to this essay are to the version reprinted in Darwall, Gibbard, and Railton, eds., Moral Discourse and Practice, 71-82); A. J. Ayer, Language, Truth, and Logic, 2d ed. (New York: Dover Publications, 1952), 108; R. M. Hare, The Language of Morals (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1952), 1-5; Blackburn, "How to Be an Ethical Antirealist"; Gibbard, Wise Choices, Apt Feelings.
22. Charles Stevenson, "The Emotive Meaning of Ethical Terms," Mind 46, no. 181 (1937): 14-37 (all subsequent references to this essay are to the version reprinted in Darwall, Gibbard, and Railton, eds., Moral Discourse and Practice, 71-82); A. J. Ayer, Language, Truth, and Logic, 2d ed. (New York: Dover Publications, 1952), 108; R. M. Hare, The Language of Morals (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1952), 1-5; Blackburn, "How to Be an Ethical Antirealist"; Gibbard, Wise Choices, Apt Feelings.
23. Charles Stevenson, "The Emotive Meaning of Ethical Terms," Mind 46, no. 181 (1937): 14-37 (all subsequent references to this essay are to the version reprinted in Darwall, Gibbard, and Railton, eds., Moral Discourse and Practice, 71-82); A. J. Ayer, Language, Truth, and Logic, 2d ed. (New York: Dover Publications, 1952), 108; R. M. Hare, The Language of Morals (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1952), 1-5; Blackburn, "How to Be an Ethical Antirealist"; Gibbard, Wise Choices, Apt Feelings.
24. Charles Stevenson, "The Emotive Meaning of Ethical Terms," Mind 46, no. 181 (1937): 14-37 (all subsequent references to this essay are to the version reprinted in Darwall, Gibbard, and Railton, eds., Moral Discourse and Practice, 71-82); A. J. Ayer, Language, Truth, and Logic, 2d ed. (New York: Dover Publications, 1952), 108; R. M. Hare, The Language of Morals (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1952), 1-5; Blackburn, "How to Be an Ethical Antirealist"; Gibbard, Wise Choices, Apt Feelings.
25. Stevenson, "The Emotive Meaning of Ethical Terms," 74, 78, 79; Ayer, Language, Truth, and Logic, 108; Hare, The Language of Morals, 4, 13, 20, 168-72.
26. Stevenson, "The Emotive Meaning of Ethical Terms," 74, 78, 79; Ayer, Language, Truth, and Logic, 108; Hare, The Language of Morals, 4, 13, 20, 168-72.
27. Stevenson, "The Emotive Meaning of Ethical Terms," 74, 78, 79; Ayer, Language, Truth, and Logic, 108; Hare, The Language of Morals, 4, 13, 20, 168-72.
28. Blackburn, "How to Be an Ethical Antirealist," 168-69.
29. Gibbard, Wise Choices, Apt Feelings, 8.
30. Ibid., 7, 46, 70. On norm acceptance, see ibid., 55-57.
31. Ibid., 7, 46, 70. On norm acceptance, see ibid., 55-57.
32. Ibid., 47. Gibbard ultimately says that normative "beliefs" are "much like any other beliefs" (ibid., 100). In his fully developed view, the state of thinking an action rational is more complex than that of accepting norms that permit it. It consists, roughly, in ruling out all combinations of a normative system with a possible state of the world which are such that the normative system would prohibit the action in the given state of the world.
33. Ibid., 47. Gibbard ultimately says that normative "beliefs" are "much like any other beliefs" (ibid., 100). In his fully developed view, the state of thinking an action rational is more complex than that of accepting norms that permit it. It consists, roughly, in ruling out all combinations of a normative system with a possible state of the world which are such that the normative system would prohibit the action in the given state of the world.
34. Similarly, if I assert something, my sincerity depends on my believing what I say. Moore's paradox reveals that more than just this is involved in the relation between assertion and belief. To see this, consider the Moore-paradoxical sentence, "There is a smokestack in Bowling Green, but I do not believe there is a smokestack in Bowling Green." If I utter this sentence, my sincerity in saying that there is a smokestack in Bowling Green depends on my believing that there is a smokestack in Bowling Green, which I then say I do not believe. Hence, I undermine my own sincerity. But, more than this, in uttering the Moore-paradoxical sentence, I do not succeed in asserting that there is a smokestack in Bowling Green, because asserting something involves a kind of commitment to belief that I reject in the last half of the utterance. Indeed, it is not clear, other things being equal, what speech-act I perform in uttering this sentence. Compare this case with that of promising. If I promise that p, my sincerity depends on my intending that p, so it would be odd to say, "I promise to build a smokestack in Bowling Green, but I have no intention of building one." In saying this, I would undermine the sincerity of my own promise. Despite this, however, I might succeed in promising, for I might obligate myself to build a smokestack even though what I say implies that my promise is insincere. Hence, it seems, the assertion that p involves a commitment to believing that p that cannot be canceled without undermining the assertion. In contrast, although the promise that p involves a kind of commitment to intending that p, it appears that this commitment can be canceled without undermining the promise, even though canceling it does undermine the sincerity of the promise. See Paul Grice, Studies in the Ways of Words (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989), 42. Kent Bach and Robert Harnish provide an account of assertion that elegantly explains why it is that a person who says that p, and then adds that he does not believe that p, would fail thereby to assert that p. See Bach and Harnish, Linguistic Communication and Speech Acts, 15-16.
35. Similarly, if I assert something, my sincerity depends on my believing what I say. Moore's paradox reveals that more than just this is involved in the relation between assertion and belief. To see this, consider the Moore-paradoxical sentence, "There is a smokestack in Bowling Green, but I do not believe there is a smokestack in Bowling Green." If I utter this sentence, my sincerity in saying that there is a smokestack in Bowling Green depends on my believing that there is a smokestack in Bowling Green, which I then say I do not believe. Hence, I undermine my own sincerity. But, more than this, in uttering the Moore-paradoxical sentence, I do not succeed in asserting that there is a smokestack in Bowling Green, because asserting something involves a kind of commitment to belief that I reject in the last half of the utterance. Indeed, it is not clear, other things being equal, what speech-act I perform in uttering this sentence. Compare this case with that of promising. If I promise that p, my sincerity depends on my intending that p, so it would be odd to say, "I promise to build a smokestack in Bowling Green, but I have no intention of building one." In saying this, I would undermine the sincerity of my own promise. Despite this, however, I might succeed in promising, for I might obligate myself to build a smokestack even though what I say implies that my promise is insincere. Hence, it seems, the assertion that p involves a commitment to believing that p that cannot be canceled without undermining the assertion. In contrast, although the promise that p involves a kind of commitment to intending that p, it appears that this commitment can be canceled without undermining the promise, even though canceling it does undermine the sincerity of the promise. See Paul Grice, Studies in the Ways of Words (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989), 42. Kent Bach and Robert Harnish provide an account of assertion that elegantly explains why it is that a person who says that p, and then adds that he does not believe that p, would fail thereby to assert that p. See Bach and Harnish, Linguistic Communication and Speech Acts, 15-16.
36. Compare Hare, The Language of Morals, 10.
37. Gibbard, Wise Choices, Apt Feelings, 84.
38. Smith, The Moral Problem, 7.
39. Janice Dowell helped me to think through Smith's example.
40. Steven Davis urged me, in conversation, to note cases of this kind.
41. Hare, The Language of Morals, 124-26, 167 ff. See also Smith, The Moral Problem, 68-71.
42. Hare, The Language of Morals, 124-26, 167 ff. See also Smith, The Moral Problem, 68-71.
43. For Hare, the amoralist does not make a moral judgment. Rather, he expresses a belief about the moral judgments of other people (Hare, The Language of Morals, 124), or perhaps a belief about relevant local moral standards, such as the belief that local moral standards require giving to famine relief (ibid., 167). Therefore, on Hare's view, to deny what the amoralist says would be to deny something of this kind. It would not be to make a moral judgment and hence it would not be to judge that one morally ought not give to famine relief. This is what strikes me as implausible. A full discussion of these matters is outside the scope of this essay.
44. For Hare, the amoralist does not make a moral judgment. Rather, he expresses a belief about the moral judgments of other people (Hare, The Language of Morals, 124), or perhaps a belief about relevant local moral standards, such as the belief that local moral standards require giving to famine relief (ibid., 167). Therefore, on Hare's view, to deny what the amoralist says would be to deny something of this kind. It would not be to make a moral judgment and hence it would not be to judge that one morally ought not give to famine relief. This is what strikes me as implausible. A full discussion of these matters is outside the scope of this essay.
45. Gottlob Frege, "On sense and Meaning," in Frege, Collected Papers on Mathematics, Logic, and Philosophy, ed. Brian McGuinness (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1984), 161; Gottlob Frege, "Concept and Object," in Frege, Collected Papers, 185; Gottlob Frege, "Thoughts," in Frege, Collected Papers, 357 See also Gottlob Frege, "Separating a Thought from Its Trappings," in Frege, Posthumous Writings, ed. Friedrich Kambartel and Friedrich Kaulbach (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979), 140-41; and Gottlob Frege, "A Brief Survey of My Logical Doctrines," in Frege, Posthumous Writings, 197-98. I owe these references to Janice Dowell and Kent Bach. 25 Recall that a basic moral proposition is a proposition that entails that something instantiates M, where M is a moral property. See note 8 above.
46. Gottlob Frege, "On sense and Meaning," in Frege, Collected Papers on Mathematics, Logic, and Philosophy, ed. Brian McGuinness (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1984), 161; Gottlob Frege, "Concept and Object," in Frege, Collected Papers, 185; Gottlob Frege, "Thoughts," in Frege, Collected Papers, 357 See also Gottlob Frege, "Separating a Thought from Its Trappings," in Frege, Posthumous Writings, ed. Friedrich Kambartel and Friedrich Kaulbach (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979), 140-41; and Gottlob Frege, "A Brief Survey of My Logical Doctrines," in Frege, Posthumous Writings, 197-98. I owe these references to Janice Dowell and Kent Bach. 25 Recall that a basic moral proposition is a proposition that entails that something instantiates M, where M is a moral property. See note 8 above.
47. Gottlob Frege, "On sense and Meaning," in Frege, Collected Papers on Mathematics, Logic, and Philosophy, ed. Brian McGuinness (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1984), 161; Gottlob Frege, "Concept and Object," in Frege, Collected Papers, 185; Gottlob Frege, "Thoughts," in Frege, Collected Papers, 357 See also Gottlob Frege, "Separating a Thought from Its Trappings," in Frege, Posthumous Writings, ed. Friedrich Kambartel and Friedrich Kaulbach (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979), 140-41; and Gottlob Frege, "A Brief Survey of My Logical Doctrines," in Frege, Posthumous Writings, 197-98. I owe these references to Janice Dowell and Kent Bach. 25 Recall that a basic moral proposition is a proposition that entails that something instantiates M, where M is a moral property. See note 8 above.
48. Gottlob Frege, "On sense and Meaning," in Frege, Collected Papers on Mathematics, Logic, and Philosophy, ed. Brian McGuinness (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1984), 161; Gottlob Frege, "Concept and Object," in Frege, Collected Papers, 185; Gottlob Frege, "Thoughts," in Frege, Collected Papers, 357 See also Gottlob Frege, "Separating a Thought from Its Trappings," in Frege, Posthumous Writings, ed. Friedrich Kambartel and Friedrich Kaulbach (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979), 140-41; and Gottlob Frege, "A Brief Survey of My Logical Doctrines," in Frege, Posthumous Writings, 197-98. I owe these references to Janice Dowell and Kent Bach. 25 Recall that a basic moral proposition is a proposition that entails that something instantiates M, where M is a moral property. See note 8 above.
49. Gottlob Frege, "On sense and Meaning," in Frege, Collected Papers on Mathematics, Logic, and Philosophy, ed. Brian McGuinness (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1984), 161; Gottlob Frege, "Concept and Object," in Frege, Collected Papers, 185; Gottlob Frege, "Thoughts," in Frege, Collected Papers, 357 See also Gottlob Frege, "Separating a Thought from Its Trappings," in Frege, Posthumous Writings, ed. Friedrich Kambartel and Friedrich Kaulbach (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979), 140-41; and Gottlob Frege, "A Brief Survey of My Logical Doctrines," in Frege, Posthumous Writings, 197-98. I owe these references to Janice Dowell and Kent Bach. 25 Recall that a basic moral proposition is a proposition that entails that something instantiates M, where M is a moral property. See note 8 above.
50. Frege, "Separating a Thought from Its Trappings," 140-41. This paragraph and the next follow Frege's discussion.
51. American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language, 3rd ed., s.v. "cur." Kent Bach and Thomas E. Hill, Jr., drew my attention, in conversation, to worries about whether the meaning of "cur" in contemporary English undermined the effectiveness of Frege's example.
52. Frege, "A Brief Survey of My Logical Doctrines," 197-98. I think it would be preferable to say that the coloring is a property of the sentence used to state the thought rather than a property of the thought itself.
53. Michael Dummett would say, I think, that the relevant difference between "cur" and "mongrel dog" is to be accounted for in "the theory of force," which he takes to be part of the theory of meaning along with the theory of reference and the theory of sense See Michael Dummett, "What Is a Theory of Meaning? (II)," in Dummett, The Seas of Language (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 40, 87.
54. Compare Stevenson on the expressions "elderly spinster" and "old maid." Stevenson "The Emotive Meaning of Ethical Terms," 77.
55. Frege, "Separating a Thought from Its Trappings," 141.
56. Ibid., 140.
57. Grice holds that "conversational implicatures" are cancelable but "conventional implicatures" are not. I am disagreeing with him, in effect, since I think coloring is an example of conventional implicature. However, I am using the term "admissible" in a less strict sense than Grice does. Grice, Studies in the Ways of Words, 44, 39 (emphasis in original).
58. Kent Bach suggested to me in conversation that it might be useful to distinguish between two kinds of pejorative terms. There are (a) terms, such as "Yankee" and "cur", that are used to refer contemptuously to a class of persons or things such that their use typically expresses or implies contempt for all persons or things in that class; and (b) terms, such as "jerk," that are used to refer contemptuously to persons or things such that their use implies that the speaker has contempt for the person or thing explicitly referred to but does not imply that she has contempt for anyone or anything else. The remark "Alice is a Yankee" implies that the speaker has contempt for Americans in general as well as for Alice, but the remark "Alice is a jerk" only implies contempt for Alice. Compare "If Alice shows up at the Fourth of July celebration, she is a jerk" with "If Alice shows up at the Fourth of July celebration, she is a Yankee."
59. Grice uses the notion of detachability to distinguish between "conventional" and "non-conventional" implicatures. Grice, Studies in the Ways of Words, 39, 43-44.
60. Stephen Neale, "Coloring and Composition," in Kumiko Murasagi and Robert Stainton, eds., Philosophy and Linguistics (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1999), 72-73. I owe this reference to Kent Bach.
61. Ibid., 60-61.
62. Ibid., 75 and throughout. See Kent Bach, "The Myth of Conventional Implicature," Linguistics and Philosophy 22, no. 4 (1999): 327-66. Bach also introduces a multiple-propositions framework. This use of the terms "primary" and "secondary" is his. The multiple-propositions framework is quite flexible. Neale holds that the context in which a sentence is uttered, and the issues that are central in the conversation, can affect whether the falsity of a secondary proposition would lead us to view a speaker's assertion as false. Neale, "Coloring and Composition," 75.
63. Ibid., 75 and throughout. See Kent Bach, "The Myth of Conventional Implicature," Linguistics and Philosophy 22, no. 4 (1999): 327-66. Bach also introduces a multiple-propositions framework. This use of the terms "primary" and "secondary" is his. The multiple-propositions framework is quite flexible. Neale holds that the context in which a sentence is uttered, and the issues that are central in the conversation, can affect whether the falsity of a secondary proposition would lead us to view a speaker's assertion as false. Neale, "Coloring and Composition," 75.
64. Ibid., 75 and throughout. See Kent Bach, "The Myth of Conventional Implicature," Linguistics and Philosophy 22, no. 4 (1999): 327-66. Bach also introduces a multiple-propositions framework. This use of the terms "primary" and "secondary" is his. The multiple-propositions framework is quite flexible. Neale holds that the context in which a sentence is uttered, and the issues that are central in the conversation, can affect whether the falsity of a secondary proposition would lead us to view a speaker's assertion as false. Neale, "Coloring and Composition," 75.
65. On this point, see Grice, Studies in the Ways of Words, 41, 46, 86; Bach, "The Myth of Conventional Implicature"; and Neale, "Coloring and Composition," 53-61.
66. On this point, see Grice, Studies in the Ways of Words, 41, 46, 86; Bach, "The Myth of Conventional Implicature"; and Neale, "Coloring and Composition," 53-61.
67. On this point, see Grice, Studies in the Ways of Words, 41, 46, 86; Bach, "The Myth of Conventional Implicature"; and Neale, "Coloring and Composition," 53-61.
68. Neale, "Coloring and Composition," 53.
69. On conversational implicature, see Grice, Studies in the Ways of Words, 22-57. See also Bach and Harnish, Linguistic Communication and Speech Acts, 62-64; Bach, "The Myth of Conventional Implicature," 327; and Neale, "Coloring and Composition," 53-61.
70. On conversational implicature, see Grice, Studies in the Ways of Words, 22-57. See also Bach and Harnish, Linguistic Communication and Speech Acts, 62-64; Bach, "The Myth of Conventional Implicature," 327; and Neale, "Coloring and Composition," 53-61.
71. On conversational implicature, see Grice, Studies in the Ways of Words, 22-57. See also Bach and Harnish, Linguistic Communication and Speech Acts, 62-64; Bach, "The Myth of Conventional Implicature," 327; and Neale, "Coloring and Composition," 53-61.
72. On conversational implicature, see Grice, Studies in the Ways of Words, 22-57. See also Bach and Harnish, Linguistic Communication and Speech Acts, 62-64; Bach, "The Myth of Conventional Implicature," 327; and Neale, "Coloring and Composition," 53-61.
73. Grice, Studies in the Ways of Words, 42.
74. Moore's paradox shows that we cannot successfully assert that p while canceling the implication that we believe that p. And we cannot detach the implication that we believe that p by carefully choosing the words we use to assert that p. See ibid.; on Moore's paradox, see note 16 above.
75. It can be difficult to categorize a philosopher's view of these matters. Some of the things said by Jamie Dreier suggest, for example, that his version of "speaker relativism" is an entailment view. However, the better interpretation is surely that it is either a conversational-implicature view or a conventional-implicature view. It is also possible that he holds a view of kind (3c). See James Dreier, "Internalism and Speaker Relativism," Ethics 101, no. 1 (1990): 6-26.
76. David Copp, Morality, Normativity, and Society (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 35.
77. Bach, "The Myth of Conventional Implicature." Bach does not consider coloring; see ibid., 332 n. 8.
78. Bach, "The Myth of Conventional Implicature." Bach does not consider coloring; see ibid., 332 n. 8.
79. Frank Jackson and Philip Pettit, "A Problem for Expressivism," Analysis 58, no. 4 (1998): 239-51. I owe this reference to Kent Bach.
80. The quoted phrases are from Grice, Studies in the Ways of Words, 362, 365.
81. I have elaborated on and defended the position I present in the next few paragraphs in David Copp, Morality, Normativity, and Society. For a brief introduction to this position, see David Copp, "Does Moral Theory Need the Concept of Society?" Analyse et Kritik 19 (1997): 189-212. For a reply to some objections, see David Copp, "Morality and Society-The True and the Nasty: Reply to Leist," Analyse et Kritik 20 (1998): 30-45.
82. I have elaborated on and defended the position I present in the next few paragraphs in David Copp, Morality, Normativity, and Society. For a brief introduction to this position, see David Copp, "Does Moral Theory Need the Concept of Society?" Analyse et Kritik 19 (1997): 189-212. For a reply to some objections, see David Copp, "Morality and Society-The True and the Nasty: Reply to Leist," Analyse et Kritik 20 (1998): 30-45.
83. I have elaborated on and defended the position I present in the next few paragraphs in David Copp, Morality, Normativity, and Society. For a brief introduction to this position, see David Copp, "Does Moral Theory Need the Concept of Society?" Analyse et Kritik 19 (1997): 189-212. For a reply to some objections, see David Copp, "Morality and Society-The True and the Nasty: Reply to Leist," Analyse et Kritik 20 (1998): 30-45.
84. This position raises questions about the individuation of propositions and beliefs, and about the nature of philosophical analysis, that are beyond the scope of this essay. In the text, I try to finesse these issues. For discussion, see Jeffrey C. King, "What Is a Philosophical Analysis?" Philosophical Studies 90, no. 2 (1998): 155-79. Recall that a basic moral proposition is a proposition that entails that something instantiates M, where M is a moral property. In Copp, Morality, Normativity, and Society, I called basic moral propositions "paradigmatic." Something that is a standard or norm in my sense need not be embedded in the culture, nor need it be anything that people actually pay attention to in deciding how to live. A standard is the practical analogue of a proposition.
85. This position raises questions about the individuation of propositions and beliefs, and about the nature of philosophical analysis, that are beyond the scope of this essay. In the text, I try to finesse these issues. For discussion, see Jeffrey C. King, "What Is a Philosophical Analysis?" Philosophical Studies 90, no. 2 (1998): 155-79. Recall that a basic moral proposition is a proposition that entails that something instantiates M, where M is a moral property. In Copp, Morality, Normativity, and Society, I called basic moral propositions "paradigmatic." Something that is a standard or norm in my sense need not be embedded in the culture, nor need it be anything that people actually pay attention to in deciding how to live. A standard is the practical analogue of a proposition.
86. See the references cited in note 50 above.
87. See Copp, Morality, Normativity, and Society, 84.
88. Gibbard, Wise Choices, Apt Feelings, 33.
89. Michael Bratman, Intentions, Plans, and Practical Reason (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1987).
90. The example I use here is similar to Michael Stocker's example of the retired politician. See Michael Stocker, "Desiring the Bad: An Essay in Moral Psychology," Journal of Philosophy 76, no. 12 (1979): 741.
91. Frege, "Separating a Thought from Its Trappings," 141.
92. Blackburn, "How to Be an Ethical Antirealist," 173. See also ibid., 168-69.
93. Blackburn, "How to Be an Ethical Antirealist," 173. See also ibid., 168-69.
94. Hare, The Language of Morals, 146. See also Stevenson, "The Emotive Meaning of Ethical Terms," 78.
95. Hare, The Language of Morals, 146. See also Stevenson, "The Emotive Meaning of Ethical Terms," 78.
96. Hare, The Language of Morals, 148-49.
97. Ibid., 145.
98. Ibid., 109-10, 117-18, 118-20. In these passages, Hare appears to see that he needs to distinguish between the question "What do you mean, good?" and the question "What does 'good' mean?" The former asks about speaker's meaning, the latter about the meaning of the term.
99. Stephen Barker has recently proposed an expressivist view according to which a person making a moral assertion that M both asserts some nonmoral empirical proposition and conventionally implicates that she has a conative or motivational state C-M. I am happy enough with the second part of Barker's proposal, but according to the first part, a person making a moral judgment does not express a moral belief - instead, she expresses an ordinary empirical belief. This strikes me as quite implausible. Barker agrees with realist-expressivism that moral terms refer to robust properties, but he has no room in his account for the existence of robust moral properties. For this reason, his view qualifies as a kind of antirealist-expressivism rather than a kind of realist-expressivism. See Stephen J. Barker, "Is Value Content a Component of Conventional Implicature?" Analysis 60, no. 3 (2000): 268-79. I owe this reference to Kent Bach.
100. Gibbard, Wise Choices, Apt Feelings, 33.