Epistemic Luck

Epistemic Luck

Volumn 9780199280384, Issue , 2005, Pages 1-304

  Pritchard, Duncan ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF STIRLING   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Assertion; Content externalism internalism; Contextualism; Epistemic externalism internalism; Epistemic luck; Epistemology; Luck; Mooreanism; Moral luck; Neo mooreanism; Pyrrhonism; Relevant alternatives; Reliabilism; Scepticism; Virtue epistemology

Indexed keywords

EID: 84945657680     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1093/019928038X.001.0001     Document Type: Book

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