Sustaining cooperation in laboratory public goods experiments: A selective survey of the literature

Experimental Economics

Volumn 14, Issue 1, 2011, Pages 47-83

  Chaudhuri, Ananish ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF AUCKLAND   (New Zealand)

Author keywords

Conditional cooperation; Monetary punishments; Moral suasion; Non monetary punishments; Public goods; Sorting

Indexed keywords

EID: 79551579111     PISSN: 13864157     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s10683-010-9257-1     Document Type: Article

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