Can second-order punishment deter perverse punishment?

Experimental Economics

Volumn 9, Issue 3, 2006, Pages 265-279

  Cinyabuguma, Matthias ^a   Page, Talbot ^b   Putterman, Louis ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND BALTIMORE COUNTY   (United States)

^b BROWN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Collective action; Experiment; Public goods; Punishment

Indexed keywords

EID: 33746114558     PISSN: 13864157     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s10683-006-9127-z     Document Type: Review

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