The demand for punishment

Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization

Volumn 62, Issue 4, 2007, Pages 522-542

  Carpenter, Jeffrey P ^a  

^a MIDDLEBURY COLLEGE   (United States)

Author keywords

Experiment; Public good; Social dilemma; Social preference

Indexed keywords

EID: 33846869277     PISSN: 01672681     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2005.05.004     Document Type: Article

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