Communication and punishment in voluntary contribution experiments

Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization

Volumn 60, Issue 1, 2006, Pages 11-26

  Bochet, Olivier ^b   Page, Talbot ^a   Putterman, Louis ^a  

^a BROWN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b MAASTRICHT UNIVERSITY   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

Cheap talk; Collective action; Communication; Public goods; Punishment

Indexed keywords

EID: 33645859304     PISSN: 01672681     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2003.06.006     Document Type: Article

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