Antisocial punishment across societies

Science

Volumn 319, Issue 5868, 2008, Pages 1362-1367

  Herrmann, Benedikt ^a   Thöni, Christian ^b   Gächter, Simon ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF NOTTINGHAM   (United Kingdom)

^b UNIVERSITY OF ST GALLEN   (Switzerland)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

CIVIL SOCIETY; COMPARATIVE STUDY; COOPERATIVE BEHAVIOR; EXPERIMENTAL STUDY; LEGAL SYSTEM; SOCIAL PROBLEM;

ARTICLE; CIVIL RIGHTS; COOPERATION; CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY; ECONOMIC ASPECT; HUMAN; LAW; PRIORITY JOURNAL; PUNISHMENT; SOCIAL BEHAVIOR; SOCIAL INTERACTION; SOCIETY;

COOPERATIVE BEHAVIOR; CROSS-CULTURAL COMPARISON; EMOTIONS; GAMES, EXPERIMENTAL; HUMANS; PUNISHMENT; REGRESSION ANALYSIS; SOCIAL BEHAVIOR; SOCIAL CONTROL, FORMAL;

EID: 40449124143     PISSN: 00368075     EISSN: 10959203     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1126/science.1153808     Document Type: Article

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44. All authors contributed equally to this work. The authors thank various workshop audiences, in particular the Arts and Humanities Research Council workshops Culture and the Mind in Sheffield, and I. Bohnet, R. Boyd, S. Burks, E. Fehr, U. Fischbacher, D. Gambetta, H. Gintis, G. Grimalda, J. Henrich, P. Richerson, B. Rockenbach, R. Sapolsky, and R. Zeckhauser for helpful discussions. We are grateful for financial support from the University of Nottingham, the Grundlagenforschungsfonds at the University of St. Gallen, the Latsis Foundation (Geneva), and the EU-TMR Research Network ENDEAR (FMRX-CT98-0238). This paper is part of the MacArthur Foundation Network on Economic Environments and the Evolution of Individual Preferences and Social Norms.