Punishing free-riders: How group size affects mutual monitoring and the provision of public goods

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 60, Issue 1, 2007, Pages 31-51

  Carpenter, Jeffrey P ^a  

^a MIDDLEBURY COLLEGE   (United States)

Author keywords

Experiment; Group size; Public goods; Punishment; Simulation

Indexed keywords

EID: 34249081225     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: 10902473     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2006.08.011     Document Type: Article

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