Social norms and human cooperation

Trends in Cognitive Sciences

Volumn 8, Issue 4, 2004, Pages 185-190

  Fehr, Ernst ^a   Fischbacher, Urs ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ZURICH   (Switzerland)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

DECISION MAKING; HUMAN ENGINEERING; SOCIAL SCIENCES;

HUMAN COOPERATION; SOCIAL NORMS;

COGNITIVE SYSTEMS;

COGNITION; HUMAN; METHODOLOGY; NEUROBIOLOGY; POLLUTION; REVIEW; SOCIETY; SOCIOECONOMICS; SOCIOLOGY; THEORETICAL MODEL;

COOPERATIVE BEHAVIOR; GAMES, EXPERIMENTAL; HUMANS; INTERPERSONAL RELATIONS; SOCIAL BEHAVIOR; SOCIAL ENVIRONMENT;

EID: 1842472265     PISSN: 13646613     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.tics.2004.02.007     Document Type: Review

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