Why people punish defectors: Weak conformist transmission can stabilize costly enforcement of norms in cooperative dilemmas

Journal of Theoretical Biology

Volumn 208, Issue 1, 2001, Pages 79-89

  Henrich, Joseph ^a   Boyd, Robert ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

COGNITION; CONFORMATION; EVOLUTION; POPULATION DYNAMICS; PRIORITY JOURNAL; PROTEIN STABILITY; REVIEW;

EID: 0035819418     PISSN: 00225193     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/jtbi.2000.2202     Document Type: Article

References (28)

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9. The folk theorem in repeated games with discounting or with incomplete information
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15. The evolution of ultrasociality
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18. Theoretical aspects of the mode of transmission in cultural inheritance
19. The evolution of reciprocal altruism
20. Social learning in a common interest voting game