Strategic behavior in public good games: When partners drift apart

Economics Letters

Volumn 62, Issue 1, 1999, Pages 35-41

  Sonnemans, Joep ^a   Schram, Arthur ^a   Offerman, Theo ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF AMSTERDAM   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

C79; C91; Experiment; H41; Public good games

Indexed keywords

EID: 0033477113     PISSN: 01651765     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/s0165-1765(98)00203-1     Document Type: Article

References (10)

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