A theoretical analysis of altruism and decision error in public goods games

Journal of Public Economics

Volumn 70, Issue 2, 1998, Pages 297-323

  Anderson, Simon P ^a   Goeree, Jacob K ^a   Holt, Charles A ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA   (United States)

Author keywords

Altruism; C92; Decision error; Experiments; H41; Logit equilibrium; Public goods games

Indexed keywords

EID: 0000083687     PISSN: 00472727     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0047-2727(98)00035-8     Document Type: Article

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