Experiments in economics: Playing fair with money

Experiments in Economics: Playing Fair with Money

Volumn , Issue , 2008, Pages 1-249

  Chaudhuri, Ananish ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF AUCKLAND   (New Zealand)

Author keywords

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Indexed keywords

EID: 84909275457     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.4324/9780203884799     Document Type: Book

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