A tractable model of reciprocity and fairness

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 59, Issue 1, 2007, Pages 17-45

  Cox, James C ^a   Friedman, Daniel ^b   Gjerstad, Steven ^c  

^a GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

^c PURDUE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Altruism; Experimental economics; Game theory; Ordered probit; Reciprocity

Indexed keywords

EID: 33947599099     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: 10902473     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2006.05.001     Document Type: Article

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