Punishment and counter-punishment in public good games: Can we really govern ourselves?

Journal of Public Economics

Volumn 92, Issue 1-2, 2008, Pages 91-112

  Nikiforakis, Nikos ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MELBOURNE   (Australia)

Author keywords

Counter punishment; Decentralized punishment; Experimental economics; Public goods; Revenge

Indexed keywords

EID: 37549025371     PISSN: 00472727     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2007.04.008     Document Type: Article

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