Economic and psychological perspectives on CEO compensation: A review and synthesis

Industrial and Corporate Change

Volumn 19, Issue 3, 2010, Pages 675-712

  O'Reilly III, Charles A ^a   Main, Brian G M ^b  

^a STANFORD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF EDINBURGH   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

BEST MANAGEMENT PRACTICE; COMPENSATION SYSTEM; EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS; GAME THEORY; NUMERICAL MODEL; PSYCHOLOGY;

EID: 77955720292     PISSN: 09606491     EISSN: 14643650     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/icc/dtp050     Document Type: Article

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