Agency theory and executive compensation: The case of Chinese state-owned enterprises

Journal of Labor Economics

Volumn 22, Issue 3, 2004, Pages 615-637

  Mengistae, Taye ^a   Lixin, Colin Xu ^b  

^a WORLD BANK   (United States)

^b PEKING UNIVERSITY   (China)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 5644244409     PISSN: 0734306X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1086/383109     Document Type: Article

References (48)

1. Abowd, John M. 1900. Does performance-based managerial compensation affect corporate performance? Industrial and Labor Relations Review 43 (February), suppl.: S52-S73.
2. Abowd, John M., and David S. Kaplan. 1999. Executive compensation: Six questions that need answering. Journal of Economic Perspective 13 (Fall): 145-68.
3. Ackerberg, Daniel A., and Maristella Botticini. 2002. Endogenous matching and the empirical determinants of contract form. Journal of Political Economy 110 (June): 564-91.
4. Aggarwal, Rajesh K., and Andrew A. Samwick. 1999. The other side of the trade-off: The impact of risk on executive compensation. Journal of Political Economy 107 (February): 65-105.
5. Agrawal, A., and Charles Knoeber. 1998. Managerial compensation and the threat of takeover. Journal of Financial Economics 47 (February): 219-39.
6. Antle, Rick, and Abbie Smith. 1986. An empirical investigation of the relative performance evaluation of corporate executives. Journal of Accounting Research 24 (Spring): 296-325.
7. Baker, George P., and Brian J. Hall. 1998. CEO compensation and firm size. NBER Working Paper no. 6868, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA.
8. Barro, Jason R., and Robert J. Barro. 1900. Pay, performance, and turnover of bank CEOs. Journal of Labor Economics 8 (October): 448-81.
9. Bliss, R. T., and Richard J. Rosen. 2001. CEO compensation and bank mergers. Journal of Financial Economics 61 (July): 107-38.
10. Bushman, Robert, Raffi Indejikian, and Abbie Smith. 1996. CEO compensation: The role of individual performance evaluation. Journal of Accounting and Economics 21 (April): 161-93.
11. Byrd, William A. 1992. Chinese industrial firms under reform. Oxford: Oxford University Press for the World Bank.
12. Core, John E., and Wayne Guay. 1999. The use of equity grants to manage optimal equity incentives levels. Journal of Accounting and Economics 28 (December): 151-84.
13. Core, John E., Robert W. Holthausen, and David F. Larcker. 1999. Corporate governance, chief executive officer compensation, and firm performance. Journal of Financial Economics 51 (March): 371-406.
14. Garen, John E. 1994. Executive compensation and principal-agent theory. Journal of Political Economy 102 (December): 1175-99.
15. Gibbons, Robert, and Keven J. Murphy. 1990. Relative performance evaluation for chief executive officers. Special issue, Industrial and Labor Relations Review 43 (February): S30-S51.
16. _. 1992. Optimal incentive contracts in the presence of career concerns: Theory and evidence. Journal of Political Economy 100 (June): 468-505.
17. Groves, Theodore, Yongmiao Hong, John McMillan, and Barry Naughton. 1994. Autonomy and incentives in Chinese state enterprises. Quarterly Journal of Economics 109 (February): 181-209.
18. _. 1995. China's evolving managerial labor market. Journal of Political Economy 103 (August): 873-92.
19. Hall, Brian J., and Jeffrey B. Liebman. 1998. Are CEOs really paid like bureaucrats? Quarterly Journal of Economics 113 (August): 653-91.
20. Hermalin, Benjamin E., and Nancy Wallace. 2001. Firm performance and executive compensation m the savings and loan industry. Journal of Financial Economics 61 (July): 139-70.
21. Himmelberg, C., G. Hubbard, and Darius Palia. 1999. Understanding the determinants of managerial ownership and the link between ownership and performance. Journal of Financial Economics 53 (September): 354-84.
22. Holmstrom, Bengt, and Jean Tirole. 1989. The theory of the firm. In Handbook of industrial organization, vol. 1, ed. Richard Schmalensee and Robert Willig. Oxford: North-Holland.
23. Hubbard, Glenn, and Darius Palia. 1995. Executive pay and performance: Evidence from the U.S. banking industry. Journal of Financial Economics 39 (February): 105-30.
24. Janakiraman, Surya N., Richard Lambert, and David F. Larcker. 1992. An empirical investigation of the relative performance evaluation hypothesis. Journal of Accounting Research 30 (Spring): 53-69.
25. Jensen, Michael C., and Kevin J. Murphy. 1990. Performance pay and top-management incentives. Journal of Political Economy 98 (April): 225-64.
26. Jones, Derek, and Takao Kato. 1996. The determinants of chief executive compensation in transitional economies: Evidence from Bulgaria. Labor Economics 3, no. 3:319-36.
27. Joskow, Paul L., and Nancy L. Rose. 1996. CEO pay and firm performance: Dynamics, asymmetries, and alternative performance measures. NBER Working Paper no. 4976 1994, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA.
28. Joskow, P., N. Rose, and A. Shepard. 1993. Regulatory constraints on CEO compensation. NBER Working Paper no. R1825, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA.
29. Joskow, Paul L., Nancy L. Rose, and Catherine D. Wolfram. 1996. Political constraints on executive compensation: Evidence from the electric utility industry. Rand Journal of Economics 27 (Spring): 165-82.
30. Kaplan, Steven N. 1994. Top executive rewards and firm performance: A comparison of Japan and the United States. Journal of Political Economy 102 (June): 510-46.
31. Lambert, Richard, and David Larcker. 1987. An analysis of the use of accounting and market measures of performance in executive compensation contracts. Journal of Accounting Research 25, suppl.:S85-S125.
32. Lazear, Edward P. 1999. Personnel economics: Past lessons and future directions: Presidential address to the society of labor economists. Journal of Lahor Economics 17 (April): 199-236.
33. Leonard, Jonathan S. 1990. Executive pay and firm performance. Special issue, Industrial and Labor Relations Review 43 (February): 13-29.
34. Li, Wei. 1997. The impact of economic reform on the performance of Chinese state enterprise, 1980-1990. Journal of Political Economy 105:1080-1106.
35. Masson, Robert T. 1971. Executive motivations, earnings, and consequent equity performance. Journal of Political Economy 79 (November): 1278-92.
36. Mehran, Hamid. 1995. Executive compensation structure, ownership, and firm performance. Journal of Financial Economics 38 (June): 163-84.
37. Murphy, Kevin J. 1999. Executive compensation. In Handbook of labor economics, vol. 3B, ed. Orley Ashenfelter and David Card. Amsterdam, NY: North-Holland.
38. Palia, Darius. 1998. The endogeneity of managerial compensation in firm valuation: A solution. Photocopy, Columbia University, Business School.
39. Perkins, Dwight H. 1988. Reforming China's economic system. Journal of Economic Literature 26 (June): 601-45.
40. Perry, Tod, and Marc Zenner. 2001. Pay for performance? Government regulation and the structure of compensation contracts. Journal of Financial Economics 62 (December): 453-88.
41. Prendergast, Canice. 1999. The provision of incentives in firms. Journal of Economic Literature 37 (March): 7-63.
42. _. 2002. The tenuous tradeoff between risk and incentives. Journal of Political Economy 110 (October): 1071-1102.
43. Rosen, Sherwin. 1982. Authority, control, and the distribution of earnings. Bell Journal of Economics 13 (Autumn): 311-23.
44. _. 1992. Contracts and the market for executives. In Contract economics, ed. Lars Werin and Hans Wijkander. Cambridge, MA: Blackwell.
45. Shirley, Mary, and Lixin Colin Xu. 2001. The empirical effects of performance contracts: Evidence from China. Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 17 (April): 168-200.
46. Smith, Cliford, and Ross Watts. 1992. The investment opportunity set and corporate financing, dividend, and compensation policies. Journal of Financial Economics 32 (December): 262-92.
47. Xu, Lixin Colin. 2000. Control, incentives and competition: The impact of reform on Chinese state-owned enterprises. Economics of Transition 8 (March): 151-73.
48. Yermack, David. 1995. Do corporations award CEO stock options effectively? Journal of Financial Economics 39 (October): 237-70.