Performance Incentives within Firms: The Effect of Managerial Responsibility

Journal of Finance

Volumn 58, Issue 4, 2003, Pages 1613-1650

  Aggarwal, Rajesh K ^a   Samwick, Andrew A ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA   (United States)

^b NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0012272339     PISSN: 00221082     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1540-6261.00579     Document Type: Review

References (30)

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