Chapter 22 Economics of Conflict: An Overview

Handbook of Defense Economics

Volumn 2, Issue , 2007, Pages 649-709

  Garfinkel, Michelle R ^a   Skaperdas, Stergios ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

anarchy; bargaining; conflict technology; economic growth; exchange; governance; group formation; open conflict; power; shadow of the future

Indexed keywords

EID: 66049135694     PISSN: 15740013     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1016/S1574-0013(06)02022-9     Document Type: Review

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