Conflict and the social contract

Scandinavian Journal of Economics

Volumn 108, Issue 2, 2006, Pages 231-249

  Bester, Helmut ^a   Wärneryd, Karl ^b  

^a FREIE UNIVERSITÄT BERLIN   (Germany)

^b STOCKHOLM SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS   (Sweden)

Author keywords

Asymmetric information; Conflict; Social contracts

Indexed keywords

ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION; CONFLICT MANAGEMENT;

EID: 33746505665     PISSN: 03470520     EISSN: 14679442     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9442.2006.00452.x     Document Type: Article

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