When does universal peace prevail? Secession and group formation in conflict

Economics of Governance

Volumn 7, Issue 1, 2006, Pages 3-29

  Bloch, Francis ^a   Sánchez Pagés, Santiago ^b   Soubeyran, Raphaël ^a  

^a Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique   (France)

^b UNIVERSITY OF EDINBURGH   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Group formation; Policy conflicts; Rent seeking contests; Secession

Indexed keywords

EID: 28144457922     PISSN: 14356104     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s10101-005-0099-9     Document Type: Conference Paper

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