The distribution of income in the presence of appropriative activities

Economica

Volumn 64, Issue 253, 1997, Pages 101-1117

  Skaperdas, Stergios ^a   Syropoulos, Constantinos ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

DISTRIBUTION DETERMINANTS; INCOME DISTRIBUTION; THEORETICAL STUDY;

EID: 0031455225     PISSN: 00130427     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1468-0335.641066     Document Type: Article

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