Conflict and Distribution

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 87, Issue 2, 1999, Pages 379-415

  Esteban, Joan ^a   Ray, Debraj ^a,b  

^a Barcelona)   (Spain)

^b Boston University   (United States)

Author keywords

Conflict; Inequality; Polarization; Rent seeking

Indexed keywords

EID: 0000607851     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/jeth.1999.2549     Document Type: Article

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