Civil war and the social contract

Public Choice

Volumn 115, Issue 3, 2003, Pages 455-475

  Azam, Jean Paul ^a,b   Mesnard, Alice ^a  

^a UNIVERSITÉ DE TOULOUSE   (France)

^b Institut Universitaire de France   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0038421662     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/a:1024265631528     Document Type: Conference Paper

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