Delay in contests

European Economic Review

Volumn 48, Issue 5, 2004, Pages 1169-1178

  Bester, Helmut ^a   Konrad, Kai A ^b  

^a FREIE UNIVERSITÄT BERLIN   (Germany)

^b WZB BERLIN SOCIAL SCIENCE CENTER   (Germany)

Author keywords

Conflict; Contest; Delay

Indexed keywords

ECONOMIC THEORY;

EID: 3242672718     PISSN: 00142921     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0014-2921(03)00048-5     Document Type: Article

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