Comparing bargaining solutions in the shadow of conflict: How norms against threats can have real effects

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 106, Issue 1, 2002, Pages 1-16

  Anbarci, Nejat ^a   Skaperdas, Stergios ^b   Syropoulos, Constantinos ^a  

^a FLORIDA INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

Bargaining; Contests; Division rules; Variable threat payoffs; Variable utility possibilities set

Indexed keywords

EID: 0036749182     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/jeth.2001.2828     Document Type: Article

References (24)

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