On the formation of alliances in conflict and contests

Public Choice

Volumn 96, Issue 1-2, 1998, Pages 25-42

  Skaperdas, Stergios ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0032398068     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/a:1004912124496     Document Type: Article

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