Resource distribution and stable alliances with endogenous sharing rules

European Journal of Political Economy

Volumn 18, Issue 1, 2002, Pages 129-151

  Noh, Suk Jae ^a  

^a Hallym University   (South Korea)

Author keywords

Appropriation; Enforceable sharing rules; Production; Resource distribution; Stable alliances

Indexed keywords

EID: 0036188212     PISSN: 01762680     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0176-2680(01)00072-6     Document Type: Article

References (23)

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