Alliance formation, alliance expansion, and the core

Journal of Conflict Resolution

Volumn 43, Issue 6, 1999, Pages 727-747

  Sandler, Todd ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0033264521     PISSN: 00220027     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0022002799043006003     Document Type: Article

References (27)

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