External threat and collective action

Economic Inquiry

Volumn 43, Issue 3, 2005, Pages 519-530

  Niou, Emerson M S ^a,b   Tan, Guofu ^c  

^a DUKE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b CHINESE UNIVERSITY OF HONG KONG   (Hong Kong)

^c UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 25844465689     PISSN: 00952583     EISSN: 14657295     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/ei/cbi035     Document Type: Article

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