Restraining the genuine Homo economicus: Why the economy cannot be divorced from its governance

Economics and Politics

Volumn 15, Issue 2, 2003, Pages 135-162

  Skaperdas, Stergios ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ECONOMIC POLICY; ECONOMIC THEORY; GOVERNANCE APPROACH; MODEL;

EID: 0037592394     PISSN: 09541985     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1468-0343.00119     Document Type: Article

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