On the stability of group formation: Managing the conflict within

Conflict Management and Peace Science

Volumn 21, Issue 1, 2004, Pages 43-68

  Garfinkel, Michelle R ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

Competitive appropriation; Conflict management; Endogenous group formation

Indexed keywords

EID: 3242787991     PISSN: 07388942     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/07388940490433918     Document Type: Conference Paper

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