Conflict without misperceptions or incomplete information: How the future matters

Journal of Conflict Resolution

Volumn 44, Issue 6, 2000, Pages 793-807

  Garfinkel, Michelle R ^a   Skaperdas, Stergios ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0034340203     PISSN: 00220027     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0022002700044006005     Document Type: Article

References (19)

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