Insecure property and the efficiency of exchange

Economic Journal

Volumn 112, Issue 476, 2002, Pages 133-146

  Skaperdas, Stergios ^a   Syropoulos, Constantinos ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

^b FLORIDA INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

GOODS EXCHANGE; PROPERTY RIGHTS; RENT SEEKING;

EID: 0036149574     PISSN: 00130133     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1468-0297.0j676     Document Type: Article

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