The macrotechnology of conflict

Journal of Conflict Resolution

Volumn 44, Issue 6, 2000, Pages 773-792

  Hirshleifer, Jack ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0034340201     PISSN: 00220027     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0022002700044006004     Document Type: Article

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