International security at twenty-five: From one world to another

International Security

Volumn 26, Issue 1, 2001, Pages 5-39

  Miller, Steven E ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0035640914     PISSN: 01622889     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1162/016228801753212840     Document Type: Article

References (230)

1. I do not mean to imply that the field lacks pre-World War II antecedents. From Thucydides to Clausewitz and beyond, there have been serious efforts to think systematically and analytically about issues of war and peace. Moreover, the first stirrings of the modern field of international security studies can be clearly traced to the late 1930s. Examples of strategic thought from that and earlier periods can be found in the classic volume, Edward Mead Earle, ed., Makers of Modern Strategy: Military Thought from Machiavelli to Hitler (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1943). The combination of World War II, the nuclear revolution, and the emergence of the Cold War, however galvanized attention to these issues and produced a field that was much more extensive and visible than the more episodic work that came before. An interesting discussion of mterwar and immediate postwar security studies can be found in David A. Baldwin, "Security Studies and the End of the Cold War," World Politics, Vol. 48, No. 1 (October 1996), especially pp. 119-120.
2. I do not mean to imply that the field lacks pre-World War II antecedents. From Thucydides to Clausewitz and beyond, there have been serious efforts to think systematically and analytically about issues of war and peace. Moreover, the first stirrings of the modern field of international security studies can be clearly traced to the late 1930s. Examples of strategic thought from that and earlier periods can be found in the classic volume, Edward Mead Earle, ed., Makers of Modern Strategy: Military Thought from Machiavelli to Hitler (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1943). The combination of World War II, the nuclear revolution, and the emergence of the Cold War, however galvanized attention to these issues and produced a field that was much more extensive and visible than the more episodic work that came before. An interesting discussion of mterwar and immediate postwar security studies can be found in David A. Baldwin, "Security Studies and the End of the Cold War," World Politics, Vol. 48, No. 1 (October 1996), especially pp. 119-120.
3. In what follows, I refer liberally to the contents of International Security over the years, but obviously it is impossible to cite every article among the roughly 900 published items in the first 100 issues of the journal. Similarly, though I range through a large number of topics, I cannot cover every worthy issue. This essay is meant to be illustrative rather than comprehensive. Apologies to all those who might have been cited but were not.
4. "Foreword," International Security, Vol. 1, No. 1 (Summer 1976), p. 2.
5. See, for example, Adm. Elmo R. Zumwalt, "An Assessment of the Bomber-Cruise Missile Controversy," International Security, Vol. 2, No. 1 (Summer 1977), pp. 47-58; Brian Fall, "Commentary on Human Rights and Security: The Helsinki Conference, Belgrade, and European Security," ibid., pp. 100-105; Mariano Grondona, "Reconciling Internal Security and Human Rights," International Security, Vol. 3, No. 1 (Summer 1978), pp. 3-16; Neta C. Crawford, "The Passion of World Politics: Propositions on Emotion and Emotional Relationships," International Security, Vol. 24, No. 4 (Spring 2000), pp. 116-156; Thomas C. Schelling, "Who Will Have the Bomb?" International Security, Vol. 1, No. 1 (Summer 1976), pp. 77-91; Robert S. McNamara, "Population and International Security," International Security, Vol. 2, No. 2 (Fall 1977), pp. 25-55; and Nick Eberstadt and Eric Breindel, "The Population Factor in the Middle East," ibid., pp. 190-196.
6. See, for example, Adm. Elmo R. Zumwalt, "An Assessment of the Bomber-Cruise Missile Controversy," International Security, Vol. 2, No. 1 (Summer 1977), pp. 47-58; Brian Fall, "Commentary on Human Rights and Security: The Helsinki Conference, Belgrade, and European Security," ibid., pp. 100-105; Mariano Grondona, "Reconciling Internal Security and Human Rights," International Security, Vol. 3, No. 1 (Summer 1978), pp. 3-16; Neta C. Crawford, "The Passion of World Politics: Propositions on Emotion and Emotional Relationships," International Security, Vol. 24, No. 4 (Spring 2000), pp. 116-156; Thomas C. Schelling, "Who Will Have the Bomb?" International Security, Vol. 1, No. 1 (Summer 1976), pp. 77-91; Robert S. McNamara, "Population and International Security," International Security, Vol. 2, No. 2 (Fall 1977), pp. 25-55; and Nick Eberstadt and Eric Breindel, "The Population Factor in the Middle East," ibid., pp. 190-196.
7. See, for example, Adm. Elmo R. Zumwalt, "An Assessment of the Bomber-Cruise Missile Controversy," International Security, Vol. 2, No. 1 (Summer 1977), pp. 47-58; Brian Fall, "Commentary on Human Rights and Security: The Helsinki Conference, Belgrade, and European Security," ibid., pp. 100-105; Mariano Grondona, "Reconciling Internal Security and Human Rights," International Security, Vol. 3, No. 1 (Summer 1978), pp. 3-16; Neta C. Crawford, "The Passion of World Politics: Propositions on Emotion and Emotional Relationships," International Security, Vol. 24, No. 4 (Spring 2000), pp. 116-156; Thomas C. Schelling, "Who Will Have the Bomb?" International Security, Vol. 1, No. 1 (Summer 1976), pp. 77-91; Robert S. McNamara, "Population and International Security," International Security, Vol. 2, No. 2 (Fall 1977), pp. 25-55; and Nick Eberstadt and Eric Breindel, "The Population Factor in the Middle East," ibid., pp. 190-196.
8. See, for example, Adm. Elmo R. Zumwalt, "An Assessment of the Bomber-Cruise Missile Controversy," International Security, Vol. 2, No. 1 (Summer 1977), pp. 47-58; Brian Fall, "Commentary on Human Rights and Security: The Helsinki Conference, Belgrade, and European Security," ibid., pp. 100-105; Mariano Grondona, "Reconciling Internal Security and Human Rights," International Security, Vol. 3, No. 1 (Summer 1978), pp. 3-16; Neta C. Crawford, "The Passion of World Politics: Propositions on Emotion and Emotional Relationships," International Security, Vol. 24, No. 4 (Spring 2000), pp. 116-156; Thomas C. Schelling, "Who Will Have the Bomb?" International Security, Vol. 1, No. 1 (Summer 1976), pp. 77-91; Robert S. McNamara, "Population and International Security," International Security, Vol. 2, No. 2 (Fall 1977), pp. 25-55; and Nick Eberstadt and Eric Breindel, "The Population Factor in the Middle East," ibid., pp. 190-196.
9. See, for example, Adm. Elmo R. Zumwalt, "An Assessment of the Bomber-Cruise Missile Controversy," International Security, Vol. 2, No. 1 (Summer 1977), pp. 47-58; Brian Fall, "Commentary on Human Rights and Security: The Helsinki Conference, Belgrade, and European Security," ibid., pp. 100-105; Mariano Grondona, "Reconciling Internal Security and Human Rights," International Security, Vol. 3, No. 1 (Summer 1978), pp. 3-16; Neta C. Crawford, "The Passion of World Politics: Propositions on Emotion and Emotional Relationships," International Security, Vol. 24, No. 4 (Spring 2000), pp. 116-156; Thomas C. Schelling, "Who Will Have the Bomb?" International Security, Vol. 1, No. 1 (Summer 1976), pp. 77-91; Robert S. McNamara, "Population and International Security," International Security, Vol. 2, No. 2 (Fall 1977), pp. 25-55; and Nick Eberstadt and Eric Breindel, "The Population Factor in the Middle East," ibid., pp. 190-196.
10. See, for example, Adm. Elmo R. Zumwalt, "An Assessment of the Bomber-Cruise Missile Controversy," International Security, Vol. 2, No. 1 (Summer 1977), pp. 47-58; Brian Fall, "Commentary on Human Rights and Security: The Helsinki Conference, Belgrade, and European Security," ibid., pp. 100-105; Mariano Grondona, "Reconciling Internal Security and Human Rights," International Security, Vol. 3, No. 1 (Summer 1978), pp. 3-16; Neta C. Crawford, "The Passion of World Politics: Propositions on Emotion and Emotional Relationships," International Security, Vol. 24, No. 4 (Spring 2000), pp. 116-156; Thomas C. Schelling, "Who Will Have the Bomb?" International Security, Vol. 1, No. 1 (Summer 1976), pp. 77-91; Robert S. McNamara, "Population and International Security," International Security, Vol. 2, No. 2 (Fall 1977), pp. 25-55; and Nick Eberstadt and Eric Breindel, "The Population Factor in the Middle East," ibid., pp. 190-196.
11. See, for example, Adm. Elmo R. Zumwalt, "An Assessment of the Bomber-Cruise Missile Controversy," International Security, Vol. 2, No. 1 (Summer 1977), pp. 47-58; Brian Fall, "Commentary on Human Rights and Security: The Helsinki Conference, Belgrade, and European Security," ibid., pp. 100-105; Mariano Grondona, "Reconciling Internal Security and Human Rights," International Security, Vol. 3, No. 1 (Summer 1978), pp. 3-16; Neta C. Crawford, "The Passion of World Politics: Propositions on Emotion and Emotional Relationships," International Security, Vol. 24, No. 4 (Spring 2000), pp. 116-156; Thomas C. Schelling, "Who Will Have the Bomb?" International Security, Vol. 1, No. 1 (Summer 1976), pp. 77-91; Robert S. McNamara, "Population and International Security," International Security, Vol. 2, No. 2 (Fall 1977), pp. 25-55; and Nick Eberstadt and Eric Breindel, "The Population Factor in the Middle East," ibid., pp. 190-196.
12. See, in particular, David Alan Rosenberg, "The Origins of Overkill: Nuclear Weapons and American Strategy, 1945-1960," International Security, Vol. 7, No. 4 (Spring 1983), pp. 3-71. See also David Alan Rosenberg, "'A Smoking Radiating Ruin at the End of Two Hours': Documents on American Plans for Nuclear War with the Soviet Union, 1954-55," International Security, Vol. 6, No. 3 (Winter 1981/82), pp. 3-38.
13. See, in particular, David Alan Rosenberg, "The Origins of Overkill: Nuclear Weapons and American Strategy, 1945-1960," International Security, Vol. 7, No. 4 (Spring 1983), pp. 3-71. See also David Alan Rosenberg, "'A Smoking Radiating Ruin at the End of Two Hours': Documents on American Plans for Nuclear War with the Soviet Union, 1954-55," International Security, Vol. 6, No. 3 (Winter 1981/82), pp. 3-38.
14. Marc Trachtenberg, "A 'Wasting Asset': American Strategy and the Shifting Nuclear Balance, 1949-1954," International Security, Vol. 13, No. 3 (Winter 1988/89), pp. 5-49.
15. One of the most widely cited and reprinted articles to appear in IS is John Lewis Gaddis, "The Long Peace: Elements of Stability in the Postwar International System," International Security, Vol. 10, No. 4 (Spring 1986), pp. 99-142. His provocative assessment of the end of the Cold War is "International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War," International Security, Vol. 17, No. 3 (Winter 1992/93), pp. 5-58.
16. One of the most widely cited and reprinted articles to appear in IS is John Lewis Gaddis, "The Long Peace: Elements of Stability in the Postwar International System," International Security, Vol. 10, No. 4 (Spring 1986), pp. 99-142. His provocative assessment of the end of the Cold War is "International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War," International Security, Vol. 17, No. 3 (Winter 1992/93), pp. 5-58.
17. The original set of articles on World War I appeared in International Security, Vol. 9, No. 1 (Summer 1984), and included essays by Paul M. Kennedy, Michael Howard, Stephen Van Evera, Jack Snyder, and Richard Ned Lebow. These subsequently appeared in Steven E. Miller, ed., Military Strategy and the Origins of the First World War (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1985). A revised and expanded edition, including subsequent articles on World War I that appeared in IS, was later published: Steven E. Miller, Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Stephen Van Evera, eds., Military Strategy and the Origins of the First World War (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1991).
18. The original set of articles on World War I appeared in International Security, Vol. 9, No. 1 (Summer 1984), and included essays by Paul M. Kennedy, Michael Howard, Stephen Van Evera, Jack Snyder, and Richard Ned Lebow. These subsequently appeared in Steven E. Miller, ed., Military Strategy and the Origins of the First World War (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1985). A revised and expanded edition, including subsequent articles on World War I that appeared in IS, was later published: Steven E. Miller, Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Stephen Van Evera, eds., Military Strategy and the Origins of the First World War (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1991).
19. The original set of articles on World War I appeared in International Security, Vol. 9, No. 1 (Summer 1984), and included essays by Paul M. Kennedy, Michael Howard, Stephen Van Evera, Jack Snyder, and Richard Ned Lebow. These subsequently appeared in Steven E. Miller, ed., Military Strategy and the Origins of the First World War (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1985). A revised and expanded edition, including subsequent articles on World War I that appeared in IS, was later published: Steven E. Miller, Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Stephen Van Evera, eds., Military Strategy and the Origins of the First World War (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1991).
20. Richard L. Garwin, "Effective Military Technology for the 1980s," International Security, Vol. 1, No. 2 (Fall 1976), pp. 50-77.
21. Illustrative articles include Ashton B. Carter, "Satellites and Anti-Satellites: The Limits of the Possible," International Security, Vol. 10, No. 4 (Spring 1986), pp. 46-98; William H. Daugherty, Barbara Levi, and Frank von Hippel, "The Consequences of 'Limited' Nuclear Attacks on the United States," ibid., pp. 3-45; Steve Fetter, "Stockpile Confidence under a Nuclear Test Ban," International Security, Vol. 12, No. 3 (Winter 1987/88), pp. 132-167; Vipin Gupta, "New Satellite Images for Sale," International Security, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Summer 1995), pp. 94-125; Barry E. Fridling and John R. Harvey, "On the Wrong Track? An Assessment of MX Rail Garrison Basing," International Security, Vol. 13, No. 3 (Winter 1988/89), pp. 113-141; and Irving Lachow, "The GPS Dilemma: Balancing Military Risks and Economic Benefits," International Security, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Summer 1995), pp. 126-148.
22. Illustrative articles include Ashton B. Carter, "Satellites and Anti-Satellites: The Limits of the Possible," International Security, Vol. 10, No. 4 (Spring 1986), pp. 46-98; William H. Daugherty, Barbara Levi, and Frank von Hippel, "The Consequences of 'Limited' Nuclear Attacks on the United States," ibid., pp. 3-45; Steve Fetter, "Stockpile Confidence under a Nuclear Test Ban," International Security, Vol. 12, No. 3 (Winter 1987/88), pp. 132-167; Vipin Gupta, "New Satellite Images for Sale," International Security, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Summer 1995), pp. 94-125; Barry E. Fridling and John R. Harvey, "On the Wrong Track? An Assessment of MX Rail Garrison Basing," International Security, Vol. 13, No. 3 (Winter 1988/89), pp. 113-141; and Irving Lachow, "The GPS Dilemma: Balancing Military Risks and Economic Benefits," International Security, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Summer 1995), pp. 126-148.
23. Illustrative articles include Ashton B. Carter, "Satellites and Anti-Satellites: The Limits of the Possible," International Security, Vol. 10, No. 4 (Spring 1986), pp. 46-98; William H. Daugherty, Barbara Levi, and Frank von Hippel, "The Consequences of 'Limited' Nuclear Attacks on the United States," ibid., pp. 3-45; Steve Fetter, "Stockpile Confidence under a Nuclear Test Ban," International Security, Vol. 12, No. 3 (Winter 1987/88), pp. 132-167; Vipin Gupta, "New Satellite Images for Sale," International Security, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Summer 1995), pp. 94-125; Barry E. Fridling and John R. Harvey, "On the Wrong Track? An Assessment of MX Rail Garrison Basing," International Security, Vol. 13, No. 3 (Winter 1988/89), pp. 113-141; and Irving Lachow, "The GPS Dilemma: Balancing Military Risks and Economic Benefits," International Security, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Summer 1995), pp. 126-148.
24. Illustrative articles include Ashton B. Carter, "Satellites and Anti-Satellites: The Limits of the Possible," International Security, Vol. 10, No. 4 (Spring 1986), pp. 46-98; William H. Daugherty, Barbara Levi, and Frank von Hippel, "The Consequences of 'Limited' Nuclear Attacks on the United States," ibid., pp. 3-45; Steve Fetter, "Stockpile Confidence under a Nuclear Test Ban," International Security, Vol. 12, No. 3 (Winter 1987/88), pp. 132-167; Vipin Gupta, "New Satellite Images for Sale," International Security, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Summer 1995), pp. 94-125; Barry E. Fridling and John R. Harvey, "On the Wrong Track? An Assessment of MX Rail Garrison Basing," International Security, Vol. 13, No. 3 (Winter 1988/89), pp. 113-141; and Irving Lachow, "The GPS Dilemma: Balancing Military Risks and Economic Benefits," International Security, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Summer 1995), pp. 126-148.
25. Illustrative articles include Ashton B. Carter, "Satellites and Anti-Satellites: The Limits of the Possible," International Security, Vol. 10, No. 4 (Spring 1986), pp. 46-98; William H. Daugherty, Barbara Levi, and Frank von Hippel, "The Consequences of 'Limited' Nuclear Attacks on the United States," ibid., pp. 3-45; Steve Fetter, "Stockpile Confidence under a Nuclear Test Ban," International Security, Vol. 12, No. 3 (Winter 1987/88), pp. 132-167; Vipin Gupta, "New Satellite Images for Sale," International Security, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Summer 1995), pp. 94-125; Barry E. Fridling and John R. Harvey, "On the Wrong Track? An Assessment of MX Rail Garrison Basing," International Security, Vol. 13, No. 3 (Winter 1988/89), pp. 113-141; and Irving Lachow, "The GPS Dilemma: Balancing Military Risks and Economic Benefits," International Security, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Summer 1995), pp. 126-148.
26. Illustrative articles include Ashton B. Carter, "Satellites and Anti-Satellites: The Limits of the Possible," International Security, Vol. 10, No. 4 (Spring 1986), pp. 46-98; William H. Daugherty, Barbara Levi, and Frank von Hippel, "The Consequences of 'Limited' Nuclear Attacks on the United States," ibid., pp. 3-45; Steve Fetter, "Stockpile Confidence under a Nuclear Test Ban," International Security, Vol. 12, No. 3 (Winter 1987/88), pp. 132-167; Vipin Gupta, "New Satellite Images for Sale," International Security, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Summer 1995), pp. 94-125; Barry E. Fridling and John R. Harvey, "On the Wrong Track? An Assessment of MX Rail Garrison Basing," International Security, Vol. 13, No. 3 (Winter 1988/89), pp. 113-141; and Irving Lachow, "The GPS Dilemma: Balancing Military Risks and Economic Benefits," International Security, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Summer 1995), pp. 126-148.
27. See Theodore A. Postol, "Lessons of the Gulf War Experience with Patriot," International Security Vol. 16, No. 3 (Winter 1991/92), pp. 119-171. For a detailed response to Postol, see Robert M. Stein, "Patriot Experience in the Gulf War," International Security, Vol. 17, No. 1 (Summer 1992), pp. 199-225.
28. See Theodore A. Postol, "Lessons of the Gulf War Experience with Patriot," International Security Vol. 16, No. 3 (Winter 1991/92), pp. 119-171. For a detailed response to Postol, see Robert M. Stein, "Patriot Experience in the Gulf War," International Security, Vol. 17, No. 1 (Summer 1992), pp. 199-225.
29. The report of the panel is published in Jeremiah Sullivan, Dan Fenstermacher, Daniel Fisher, Ruth Howes, O'Dean Judd, and Roger Speed, "Technical Debate over Patriot Performance in the Gulf War," Science and Global Security, Vol. 8, No. 1 (1999), pp. 40-97. This report elicited further debate over Postol's critical analysis of the performance of the Patriot. For criticism of Postol and the American Physical Society Panel, see Robert M. Stein, John P. Kantelis, and Peter D. Zimmer, "Response to Science and Global Security Article Technical Debate over Patriot Performance in the Gulf War,'" Science and Global Security, Vol. 8, No. 2 (1999), pp. 217-259. For Postol's reply, see George N. Lewis and Theodore A. Postol, "Technical Debate over Patriot Performance in the Gulf War: American Physical Society Panel Correctly Rejects Criticisms of Analysis Showing Patriot Failed to Destroy Scud Warheads," Science and Global Security, Vol. 8, No. 3 (2000), pp. 357-398.
30. The report of the panel is published in Jeremiah Sullivan, Dan Fenstermacher, Daniel Fisher, Ruth Howes, O'Dean Judd, and Roger Speed, "Technical Debate over Patriot Performance in the Gulf War," Science and Global Security, Vol. 8, No. 1 (1999), pp. 40-97. This report elicited further debate over Postol's critical analysis of the performance of the Patriot. For criticism of Postol and the American Physical Society Panel, see Robert M. Stein, John P. Kantelis, and Peter D. Zimmer, "Response to Science and Global Security Article Technical Debate over Patriot Performance in the Gulf War,'" Science and Global Security, Vol. 8, No. 2 (1999), pp. 217-259. For Postol's reply, see George N. Lewis and Theodore A. Postol, "Technical Debate over Patriot Performance in the Gulf War: American Physical Society Panel Correctly Rejects Criticisms of Analysis Showing Patriot Failed to Destroy Scud Warheads," Science and Global Security, Vol. 8, No. 3 (2000), pp. 357-398.
31. The report of the panel is published in Jeremiah Sullivan, Dan Fenstermacher, Daniel Fisher, Ruth Howes, O'Dean Judd, and Roger Speed, "Technical Debate over Patriot Performance in the Gulf War," Science and Global Security, Vol. 8, No. 1 (1999), pp. 40-97. This report elicited further debate over Postol's critical analysis of the performance of the Patriot. For criticism of Postol and the American Physical Society Panel, see Robert M. Stein, John P. Kantelis, and Peter D. Zimmer, "Response to Science and Global Security Article Technical Debate over Patriot Performance in the Gulf War,'" Science and Global Security, Vol. 8, No. 2 (1999), pp. 217-259. For Postol's reply, see George N. Lewis and Theodore A. Postol, "Technical Debate over Patriot Performance in the Gulf War: American Physical Society Panel Correctly Rejects Criticisms of Analysis Showing Patriot Failed to Destroy Scud Warheads," Science and Global Security, Vol. 8, No. 3 (2000), pp. 357-398.
32. See John Aloysius Farrell, "The Patriot Gulf Missile 'Didn't Work': Defense Secretary Cohen Speaks Out," Boston Globe, January 13, 2001, p. 1.
33. Bernard Brodie, "In Quest of the Unknown Clausewitz: Review of Clausewitz and the State," International Security, Vol. 1, No. 3 (Winter 1977), pp. 62-69; and Colin S. Gray, "Across the Nuclear Divide - Strategic Studies, Past and Present," International Security, Vol. 2, No. 1 (Summer 1977), pp. 24-46.
34. Bernard Brodie, "In Quest of the Unknown Clausewitz: Review of Clausewitz and the State," International Security, Vol. 1, No. 3 (Winter 1977), pp. 62-69; and Colin S. Gray, "Across the Nuclear Divide - Strategic Studies, Past and Present," International Security, Vol. 2, No. 1 (Summer 1977), pp. 24-46.
35. The journal's heightened attention to theoretical and conceptual issues has increased its prominence in the academic literature. Since 1995, IS articles consistently have been among the most-frequently cited in all journals of international relations, according to statistics compiled by the Institute for Scientific Information in Journal Citation Reports (which ranks roughly fifty journals every year). During that period, IS has twice ranked first for citations per article, and always has been among the top five journals. (Others that have placed highly include World Politics and International Organization.)
36. Shimon Peres, "Strategy for a Transition Period," International Security, Vol. 2, No. 3 (Winter 1978), p. 12.
37. James R. Schlesinger, "Rhetoric and Realities in the Star Wars Debate," International Security, Vol. 10, No. 1 (Summer 1985), pp. 3-12.
38. Illustrations include Stanley Hoffmann, Samuel P. Huntington, Ernest R. May, Richard N. Neustadt, and Thomas C. Schelling, "Vietnam Reappraised," International Security, Vol. 6, No. 1 (Summer 1981), pp. 3-26; and Stephen Peter Rosen, "Vietnam and the American Theory of Limited War," International Security, Vol. 7, No. 2 (Fall 1982), pp. 83-113. Also relevant is John Kenneth Galbraith, "The Second Imperial Requiem," International Security, Vol. 7, No. 3 (Winter 1982/83), pp. 84-93.
39. Illustrations include Stanley Hoffmann, Samuel P. Huntington, Ernest R. May, Richard N. Neustadt, and Thomas C. Schelling, "Vietnam Reappraised," International Security, Vol. 6, No. 1 (Summer 1981), pp. 3-26; and Stephen Peter Rosen, "Vietnam and the American Theory of Limited War," International Security, Vol. 7, No. 2 (Fall 1982), pp. 83-113. Also relevant is John Kenneth Galbraith, "The Second Imperial Requiem," International Security, Vol. 7, No. 3 (Winter 1982/83), pp. 84-93.
40. Illustrations include Stanley Hoffmann, Samuel P. Huntington, Ernest R. May, Richard N. Neustadt, and Thomas C. Schelling, "Vietnam Reappraised," International Security, Vol. 6, No. 1 (Summer 1981), pp. 3-26; and Stephen Peter Rosen, "Vietnam and the American Theory of Limited War," International Security, Vol. 7, No. 2 (Fall 1982), pp. 83-113. Also relevant is John Kenneth Galbraith, "The Second Imperial Requiem," International Security, Vol. 7, No. 3 (Winter 1982/83), pp. 84-93.
41. This interpretation was offered by James R. Schlesinger, "The Evolution of American Policy toward the Soviet Union," International Security, Vol. 1, No. 1 (Summer 1976), p. 45.
42. This was the view of Hans J. Morgenthau, "The Pathology of American Power," International Security, Vol. 1, No. 3 (Winter 1977), p. 11.
43. On this question, see Dimitri K. Simes, "The Death of Détente?" International Security, Vol. 5, No. 1 (Summer 1980), pp. 3-25.
44. Morgenthau, "The Pathology of American Power," p. 11.
45. A good illustration of this point is Steve Smith, "The Increasing Insecurity of Security Studies: Conceptualizing Security in the Last Twenty Years," in Stuart Croft and Terry Terriff, eds., Critical Reflections on Security find Change (London: Frank Cass, 2000), pp. 72-101. Smith identifies and describes no fewer than seven schools of thought that represent simply the "new thinking" about security. Other chapters in the same volume also attest to the vitality of numerous contending schools of thought and illustrate the various strands of criticism directed at the "mainstream" field of international security.
46. See, for example, J. David Singer, "An Assessment of Peace Research," International Security, Vol. 1, No. 1 (Summer 1976), pp. 118-137; Thomas F. Homer-Dixon, "A Common Misapplication of the Lanchester Square Law: A Research Note," International Security, Vol. 12, No. 1 (Summer 1987), pp. 135-139; Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder, "Democratization and the Danger of War," International Security, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Summer 1995), pp. 5-38; and Zeev Maoz, The Controversy over the Democratic Peace: Rearguard Action or Cracks in the Wall?" International Security, Vol. 22, No. 1 (Summer 1997), pp. 162-198.
47. See, for example, J. David Singer, "An Assessment of Peace Research," International Security, Vol. 1, No. 1 (Summer 1976), pp. 118-137; Thomas F. Homer-Dixon, "A Common Misapplication of the Lanchester Square Law: A Research Note," International Security, Vol. 12, No. 1 (Summer 1987), pp. 135-139; Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder, "Democratization and the Danger of War," International Security, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Summer 1995), pp. 5-38; and Zeev Maoz, The Controversy over the Democratic Peace: Rearguard Action or Cracks in the Wall?" International Security, Vol. 22, No. 1 (Summer 1997), pp. 162-198.
48. See, for example, J. David Singer, "An Assessment of Peace Research," International Security, Vol. 1, No. 1 (Summer 1976), pp. 118-137; Thomas F. Homer-Dixon, "A Common Misapplication of the Lanchester Square Law: A Research Note," International Security, Vol. 12, No. 1 (Summer 1987), pp. 135-139; Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder, "Democratization and the Danger of War," International Security, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Summer 1995), pp. 5-38; and Zeev Maoz, The Controversy over the Democratic Peace: Rearguard Action or Cracks in the Wall?" International Security, Vol. 22, No. 1 (Summer 1997), pp. 162-198.
49. See, for example, J. David Singer, "An Assessment of Peace Research," International Security, Vol. 1, No. 1 (Summer 1976), pp. 118-137; Thomas F. Homer-Dixon, "A Common Misapplication of the Lanchester Square Law: A Research Note," International Security, Vol. 12, No. 1 (Summer 1987), pp. 135-139; Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder, "Democratization and the Danger of War," International Security, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Summer 1995), pp. 5-38; and Zeev Maoz, The Controversy over the Democratic Peace: Rearguard Action or Cracks in the Wall?" International Security, Vol. 22, No. 1 (Summer 1997), pp. 162-198.
50. Schlesinger, "The Evolution of American Policy toward the Soviet Union," p. 41.
51. Les Aspin, "What Are the Russians Up To?" International Security, Vol. 3, No. 1 (Summer 1978), pp. 30-54.
52. See, for example, Raymond L. Garthoff, "On Estimating and Imputing Intentions," International Security, Vol. 2, No. 3 (Winter 1978), pp. 22-32; Michael MccGwire, "Commentary: Soviet Intentions," International Security, Vol. 4, No. 1 (Summer 1979), pp. 139-143; and Jack Snyder, "Richness, Rigor, and Relevance in the Study of Soviet Foreign Policy," International Security, Vol. 9, No. 3 (Winter 1984/85), pp. 89-108.
53. See, for example, Raymond L. Garthoff, "On Estimating and Imputing Intentions," International Security, Vol. 2, No. 3 (Winter 1978), pp. 22-32; Michael MccGwire, "Commentary: Soviet Intentions," International Security, Vol. 4, No. 1 (Summer 1979), pp. 139-143; and Jack Snyder, "Richness, Rigor, and Relevance in the Study of Soviet Foreign Policy," International Security, Vol. 9, No. 3 (Winter 1984/85), pp. 89-108.
54. See, for example, Raymond L. Garthoff, "On Estimating and Imputing Intentions," International Security, Vol. 2, No. 3 (Winter 1978), pp. 22-32; Michael MccGwire, "Commentary: Soviet Intentions," International Security, Vol. 4, No. 1 (Summer 1979), pp. 139-143; and Jack Snyder, "Richness, Rigor, and Relevance in the Study of Soviet Foreign Policy," International Security, Vol. 9, No. 3 (Winter 1984/85), pp. 89-108.
55. A notable example is Franklyn Griffiths, "The Sources of American Conduct: Soviet Perspectives and Their Policy Implications," International Security, Vol. 9, No. 2 (Fall 1984), pp. 3-50.
56. See, for example, Dimitri K. Simes, "Deterrence and Coercion in Soviet Policy," International Security, Vol. 5, No. 3 (Winter 1980/81), pp. 80-103; and Jiri Valenta, "From Prague to Kabul: The Soviet Style of Invasion," International Security, Vol. 5, No. 2 (Fall 1980), pp. 114-141.
57. See, for example, Dimitri K. Simes, "Deterrence and Coercion in Soviet Policy," International Security, Vol. 5, No. 3 (Winter 1980/81), pp. 80-103; and Jiri Valenta, "From Prague to Kabul: The Soviet Style of Invasion," International Security, Vol. 5, No. 2 (Fall 1980), pp. 114-141.
58. For regional examples, see Henry Bienen, "Soviet Political Relations with Africa," International Security, Vol. 6, No. 4 (Spring 1982), pp. 153-173; A.G. Noorani, "Soviet Ambitions in South Asia," International Security, Vol. 4, No. 3 (Winter 1979/80), pp. 31-59; and Donald Zagoria, "Soviet Policy and Prospects in East Asia," International Security, Vol. 5, No. 2 (Fall 1980), pp. 66-78.
59. For regional examples, see Henry Bienen, "Soviet Political Relations with Africa," International Security, Vol. 6, No. 4 (Spring 1982), pp. 153-173; A.G. Noorani, "Soviet Ambitions in South Asia," International Security, Vol. 4, No. 3 (Winter 1979/80), pp. 31-59; and Donald Zagoria, "Soviet Policy and Prospects in East Asia," International Security, Vol. 5, No. 2 (Fall 1980), pp. 66-78.
60. For regional examples, see Henry Bienen, "Soviet Political Relations with Africa," International Security, Vol. 6, No. 4 (Spring 1982), pp. 153-173; A.G. Noorani, "Soviet Ambitions in South Asia," International Security, Vol. 4, No. 3 (Winter 1979/80), pp. 31-59; and Donald Zagoria, "Soviet Policy and Prospects in East Asia," International Security, Vol. 5, No. 2 (Fall 1980), pp. 66-78.
61. See Selig S. Harrison, "Baluch Nationalism and Superpower Rivalry," International Security, Vol. 5, No. 3 (Winter 1980/81), pp. 152-163; and William M. LeoGrande, "Drawing the Line in El Salvador," International Security, Vol. 6, No. 1 (Summer 1981), pp. 27-52.
62. See Selig S. Harrison, "Baluch Nationalism and Superpower Rivalry," International Security, Vol. 5, No. 3 (Winter 1980/81), pp. 152-163; and William M. LeoGrande, "Drawing the Line in El Salvador," International Security, Vol. 6, No. 1 (Summer 1981), pp. 27-52.
63. See, for example, Benjamin S. Lambeth, "The Political Potential of Soviet Equivalence," International Security, Vol. 4, No. 2 (Fall 1979), pp. 22-39; and Richard Burt, "Reassessing the Strategic Balance," International Security, Vol. 5, No. 1 (Summer 1980), pp. 37-52.
64. See, for example, Benjamin S. Lambeth, "The Political Potential of Soviet Equivalence," International Security, Vol. 4, No. 2 (Fall 1979), pp. 22-39; and Richard Burt, "Reassessing the Strategic Balance," International Security, Vol. 5, No. 1 (Summer 1980), pp. 37-52.
65. See John D. Steinbruner and Thomas M. Garwin, "Strategic Vulnerability: The Balance between Prudence and Paranoia," International Security, Vol. 1, No. 1 (Summer 1976), pp. 138-181; Richard L. Garwin, "Launch under Attack to Redress Minuteman Vulnerability?" International Security, Vol. 4, No. 3 (Winter 1979/80), pp. 117-139; and Albert Carnesale and Charles Glaser, "ICBM Vulnerability: The Cures Are Worse than the Disease," International Security, Vol. 7, No. 1 (Summer 1982), pp. 70-85.
66. See John D. Steinbruner and Thomas M. Garwin, "Strategic Vulnerability: The Balance between Prudence and Paranoia," International Security, Vol. 1, No. 1 (Summer 1976), pp. 138-181; Richard L. Garwin, "Launch under Attack to Redress Minuteman Vulnerability?" International Security, Vol. 4, No. 3 (Winter 1979/80), pp. 117-139; and Albert Carnesale and Charles Glaser, "ICBM Vulnerability: The Cures Are Worse than the Disease," International Security, Vol. 7, No. 1 (Summer 1982), pp. 70-85.
67. See John D. Steinbruner and Thomas M. Garwin, "Strategic Vulnerability: The Balance between Prudence and Paranoia," International Security, Vol. 1, No. 1 (Summer 1976), pp. 138-181; Richard L. Garwin, "Launch under Attack to Redress Minuteman Vulnerability?" International Security, Vol. 4, No. 3 (Winter 1979/80), pp. 117-139; and Albert Carnesale and Charles Glaser, "ICBM Vulnerability: The Cures Are Worse than the Disease," International Security, Vol. 7, No. 1 (Summer 1982), pp. 70-85.
68. On such questions, illustrative articles include Fritz W. Ermarth, "Contrasts in American and Soviet Strategic Thought," International Security, Vol. 3, No. 2 (Fall 1978), pp. 138-155; Colin S. Gray, "Nuclear Strategy: A Case for a Theory of Victory," International Security, Vol. 4, No. 1 (Summer 1979), pp. 54-87; and Donald W. Hanson, "Is Soviet Strategic Doctrine Superior?" International Security, Vol. 7, No. 3 (Winter 1982/83), pp. 61-83.
69. On such questions, illustrative articles include Fritz W. Ermarth, "Contrasts in American and Soviet Strategic Thought," International Security, Vol. 3, No. 2 (Fall 1978), pp. 138-155; Colin S. Gray, "Nuclear Strategy: A Case for a Theory of Victory," International Security, Vol. 4, No. 1 (Summer 1979), pp. 54-87; and Donald W. Hanson, "Is Soviet Strategic Doctrine Superior?" International Security, Vol. 7, No. 3 (Winter 1982/83), pp. 61-83.
70. On such questions, illustrative articles include Fritz W. Ermarth, "Contrasts in American and Soviet Strategic Thought," International Security, Vol. 3, No. 2 (Fall 1978), pp. 138-155; Colin S. Gray, "Nuclear Strategy: A Case for a Theory of Victory," International Security, Vol. 4, No. 1 (Summer 1979), pp. 54-87; and Donald W. Hanson, "Is Soviet Strategic Doctrine Superior?" International Security, Vol. 7, No. 3 (Winter 1982/83), pp. 61-83.
71. Members of the nuclear tribe will remember the heated debate over the desirability and utility of retaliatory counterforce options. See Walter Slocombe, "The Countervailing Strategy," International Security, Vol. 5, No. 4 (Spring 1981), pp. 18-27. See also Desmond Ball, "U.S. Strategic Forces: How Would They Be Used?" International Security, Vol. 7, No. 3 (Winter 1982/83), pp. 31-60.
72. Members of the nuclear tribe will remember the heated debate over the desirability and utility of retaliatory counterforce options. See Walter Slocombe, "The Countervailing Strategy," International Security, Vol. 5, No. 4 (Spring 1981), pp. 18-27. See also Desmond Ball, "U.S. Strategic Forces: How Would They Be Used?" International Security, Vol. 7, No. 3 (Winter 1982/83), pp. 31-60.
73. Colin S. Gray, "Correspondence: Perspectives on Fighting Nuclear War," International Security, Vol. 6, No. 1 (Summer 1981), p. 185.
74. Bernard Brodie, "On the Objectives of Arms Control," International Security, Vol. 1, No. 1 (Summer 1976), pp. 17-36; and Hedley Bull, "Arms Control and World Order," ibid., pp. 3-16.
75. Bernard Brodie, "On the Objectives of Arms Control," International Security, Vol. 1, No. 1 (Summer 1976), pp. 17-36; and Hedley Bull, "Arms Control and World Order," ibid., pp. 3-16.
76. Relevant illustrations include William G. Hyland, "SALT and Soviet-American Relations," International Security, Vol. 3, No. 2 (Fall 1978), pp. 156-162; Stanley Sienkiewicz, "SALT and Soviet Nuclear Doctrine," International Security, Vol. 2, No. 4 (Spring 1978), pp. 84-100; Raymond L. Garthoff, "Negotiating with the Russians: Some Lessons from SALT," International Security, Vol. 1, No. 4 (Spring 1977), pp. 3-24; McGeorge Bundy, "Maintaining Stable Deterrence," International Security, Vol. 3, No. 3 (Winter 1978/79), pp. 5-16; Robert Metzger and Paul Doty, "Arms Control Enters the Gray Area," ibid., pp. 17-52; and Michael Nacht, "In the Absence of SALT," ibid., pp. 126-137.
77. Relevant illustrations include William G. Hyland, "SALT and Soviet-American Relations," International Security, Vol. 3, No. 2 (Fall 1978), pp. 156-162; Stanley Sienkiewicz, "SALT and Soviet Nuclear Doctrine," International Security, Vol. 2, No. 4 (Spring 1978), pp. 84-100; Raymond L. Garthoff, "Negotiating with the Russians: Some Lessons from SALT," International Security, Vol. 1, No. 4 (Spring 1977), pp. 3-24; McGeorge Bundy, "Maintaining Stable Deterrence," International Security, Vol. 3, No. 3 (Winter 1978/79), pp. 5-16; Robert Metzger and Paul Doty, "Arms Control Enters the Gray Area," ibid., pp. 17-52; and Michael Nacht, "In the Absence of SALT," ibid., pp. 126-137.
78. Relevant illustrations include William G. Hyland, "SALT and Soviet-American Relations," International Security, Vol. 3, No. 2 (Fall 1978), pp. 156-162; Stanley Sienkiewicz, "SALT and Soviet Nuclear Doctrine," International Security, Vol. 2, No. 4 (Spring 1978), pp. 84-100; Raymond L. Garthoff, "Negotiating with the Russians: Some Lessons from SALT," International Security, Vol. 1, No. 4 (Spring 1977), pp. 3-24; McGeorge Bundy, "Maintaining Stable Deterrence," International Security, Vol. 3, No. 3 (Winter 1978/79), pp. 5-16; Robert Metzger and Paul Doty, "Arms Control Enters the Gray Area," ibid., pp. 17-52; and Michael Nacht, "In the Absence of SALT," ibid., pp. 126-137.
79. Relevant illustrations include William G. Hyland, "SALT and Soviet-American Relations," International Security, Vol. 3, No. 2 (Fall 1978), pp. 156-162; Stanley Sienkiewicz, "SALT and Soviet Nuclear Doctrine," International Security, Vol. 2, No. 4 (Spring 1978), pp. 84-100; Raymond L. Garthoff, "Negotiating with the Russians: Some Lessons from SALT," International Security, Vol. 1, No. 4 (Spring 1977), pp. 3-24; McGeorge Bundy, "Maintaining Stable Deterrence," International Security, Vol. 3, No. 3 (Winter 1978/79), pp. 5-16; Robert Metzger and Paul Doty, "Arms Control Enters the Gray Area," ibid., pp. 17-52; and Michael Nacht, "In the Absence of SALT," ibid., pp. 126-137.
80. Relevant illustrations include William G. Hyland, "SALT and Soviet-American Relations," International Security, Vol. 3, No. 2 (Fall 1978), pp. 156-162; Stanley Sienkiewicz, "SALT and Soviet Nuclear Doctrine," International Security, Vol. 2, No. 4 (Spring 1978), pp. 84-100; Raymond L. Garthoff, "Negotiating with the Russians: Some Lessons from SALT," International Security, Vol. 1, No. 4 (Spring 1977), pp. 3-24; McGeorge Bundy, "Maintaining Stable Deterrence," International Security, Vol. 3, No. 3 (Winter 1978/79), pp. 5-16; Robert Metzger and Paul Doty, "Arms Control Enters the Gray Area," ibid., pp. 17-52; and Michael Nacht, "In the Absence of SALT," ibid., pp. 126-137.
81. Relevant illustrations include William G. Hyland, "SALT and Soviet-American Relations," International Security, Vol. 3, No. 2 (Fall 1978), pp. 156-162; Stanley Sienkiewicz, "SALT and Soviet Nuclear Doctrine," International Security, Vol. 2, No. 4 (Spring 1978), pp. 84-100; Raymond L. Garthoff, "Negotiating with the Russians: Some Lessons from SALT," International Security, Vol. 1, No. 4 (Spring 1977), pp. 3-24; McGeorge Bundy, "Maintaining Stable Deterrence," International Security, Vol. 3, No. 3 (Winter 1978/79), pp. 5-16; Robert Metzger and Paul Doty, "Arms Control Enters the Gray Area," ibid., pp. 17-52; and Michael Nacht, "In the Absence of SALT," ibid., pp. 126-137.
82. For a collection of IS articles reflecting these concerns about missile defense, see Steven E. Miller and Stephen Van Evera, eds., The Star Wars Controversy (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1986). On the latest missile defense debate, see Charles L. Glaser and Steve Fetter, "National Missile Defense and the Future of U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy," International Security, Vol. 26, No. 1 (Summer 2001), pp. 40-92.
83. For a collection of IS articles reflecting these concerns about missile defense, see Steven E. Miller and Stephen Van Evera, eds., The Star Wars Controversy (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1986). On the latest missile defense debate, see Charles L. Glaser and Steve Fetter, "National Missile Defense and the Future of U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy," International Security, Vol. 26, No. 1 (Summer 2001), pp. 40-92.
84. See, for example, Franklyn D. Holzman, "Are the Soviets Really Outspending the U.S. on Defense?" International Security, Vol. 4, No. 4 (Spring 1980), pp. 86-104; and Franklyn D. Holzman, "Soviet Military Spending: Assessing the Numbers Game," International Security, Vol. 6, No. 4 (Spring 1982), pp. 78-101.
85. See, for example, Franklyn D. Holzman, "Are the Soviets Really Outspending the U.S. on Defense?" International Security, Vol. 4, No. 4 (Spring 1980), pp. 86-104; and Franklyn D. Holzman, "Soviet Military Spending: Assessing the Numbers Game," International Security, Vol. 6, No. 4 (Spring 1982), pp. 78-101.
86. Colin S. Gray and Jeffrey G. Barlow, "Inexcusable Restraint: The Decline of American Military Power in the 1970s," International Security, Vol. 10, No. 2 (Fall 1985), p. 27; and Robert W. Komer, "What 'Decade of Neglect'?" ibid., p. 70.
87. Colin S. Gray and Jeffrey G. Barlow, "Inexcusable Restraint: The Decline of American Military Power in the 1970s," International Security, Vol. 10, No. 2 (Fall 1985), p. 27; and Robert W. Komer, "What 'Decade of Neglect'?" ibid., p. 70.
88. See, for example, Lawrence J. Korb and Linda P. Brady, "Rearming America: The Reagan Administration Defense Program," International Security, Vol. 9, No. 3 (Winter 1984/85), pp. 3-18.
89. Jeffrey Record, "Jousting with Unreality: Reagan's Military Strategy," International Security, Vol. 8, No. 3 (Winter 1983/84), p. 3. For other criticism of the expansive nature of the Reagan strategy, see Barry R. Posen and Stephen Van Evera, "Defense Policy and the Reagan Administration: Departure from Containment," International Security, Vol. 8, No. 1 (Summer 1983), pp. 3-45.
90. Jeffrey Record, "Jousting with Unreality: Reagan's Military Strategy," International Security, Vol. 8, No. 3 (Winter 1983/84), p. 3. For other criticism of the expansive nature of the Reagan strategy, see Barry R. Posen and Stephen Van Evera, "Defense Policy and the Reagan Administration: Departure from Containment," International Security, Vol. 8, No. 1 (Summer 1983), pp. 3-45.
91. An illustration of this growing concern is Worth H. Bagley and Gene R. LaRocque, "Superpowers at Sea: A Debate," International Security, Vol. 1, No. 1 (Summer 1976), pp. 56-76. See also Michael MccGwire, "Naval Power and Soviet Global Strategy," International Security, Vol. 3, No. 4 (Spring 1979), pp. 134-189.
92. An illustration of this growing concern is Worth H. Bagley and Gene R. LaRocque, "Superpowers at Sea: A Debate," International Security, Vol. 1, No. 1 (Summer 1976), pp. 56-76. See also Michael MccGwire, "Naval Power and Soviet Global Strategy," International Security, Vol. 3, No. 4 (Spring 1979), pp. 134-189.
93. See for example, Linton F. Brooks, "Naval Power and National Security: The Case for the Maritime Strategy," International Security, Vol. 11, No. 2 (Fall 1986), pp. 58-88; and John J. Mearsheimer, "A Strategic Misstep: The Maritime Strategy and Deterrence in Europe," ibid., pp. 3-57.
94. See for example, Linton F. Brooks, "Naval Power and National Security: The Case for the Maritime Strategy," International Security, Vol. 11, No. 2 (Fall 1986), pp. 58-88; and John J. Mearsheimer, "A Strategic Misstep: The Maritime Strategy and Deterrence in Europe," ibid., pp. 3-57.
95. See Dennis Ross, "Considering Soviet Threats to the Persian Gulf," International Security, Vol. 6, No. 2 (Fall 1981), pp. 159-180. The case for alarm is made in W. Scott Thompson, "The Persian Gulf and the Correlation of Forces," International Security, Vol. 7, No. 1 (Summer 1982), pp. 157-180.
96. See Dennis Ross, "Considering Soviet Threats to the Persian Gulf," International Security, Vol. 6, No. 2 (Fall 1981), pp. 159-180. The case for alarm is made in W. Scott Thompson, "The Persian Gulf and the Correlation of Forces," International Security, Vol. 7, No. 1 (Summer 1982), pp. 157-180.
97. On this set of issues, see, for example, Joshua M. Epstein, "Soviet Vulnerabilities in Iran and the RDF Deterrent," International Security, Vol. 6, No. 2 (Fall 1981), pp. 126-158; and Kenneth N. Waltz, "A Strategy for the Rapid Deployment Force," International Security, Vol. 5, No. 4 (Spring 1981), pp. 49-73.
98. On this set of issues, see, for example, Joshua M. Epstein, "Soviet Vulnerabilities in Iran and the RDF Deterrent," International Security, Vol. 6, No. 2 (Fall 1981), pp. 126-158; and Kenneth N. Waltz, "A Strategy for the Rapid Deployment Force," International Security, Vol. 5, No. 4 (Spring 1981), pp. 49-73.
99. See Richard K. Betts, "Surprise Attack: NATO's Political Vulnerability," International Security, Vol. 5, No. 4 (Spring 1981), pp. 117-149.
100. S.J. Dudzinsky, Jr., and James Digby, "New Technology and Control of Conventional Arms," International Security, Vol. 1, No. 4 (Spring 1977), pp. 143-159.
101. Important examples in this exceptionally animated debate include John J. Mearsheimer, "Why the Soviets Can't Win Quickly in Central Europe," International Security, Vol. 7, No. 1 (Summer 1982), pp. 3-39; Barry R. Posen, "Measuring the European Conventional Balance: Coping with Complexity in Threat Assessment," International Security, Vol. 9, No. 3 (Winter 1984/85), pp. 47-88; Joshua M. Epstein, "Dynamic Analysis and the Conventional Balance in Europe," International Security, Vol. 12, No. 4 (Spring 1988), pp. 154-165; Malcolm Chalmers and Lutz Unterseher, "Is There a Tank Gap? Comparing NATO and Warsaw Pact Tank Fleets," International Security, Vol. 13, No. 1 (Summer 1988), pp. 5-49; and Eliot A. Cohen, "Toward Better Net Assessment: Rethinking the European Conventional Balance," International Security, Vol. 13, No. 1 (Summer 1988), pp. 50-89.
102. Important examples in this exceptionally animated debate include John J. Mearsheimer, "Why the Soviets Can't Win Quickly in Central Europe," International Security, Vol. 7, No. 1 (Summer 1982), pp. 3-39; Barry R. Posen, "Measuring the European Conventional Balance: Coping with Complexity in Threat Assessment," International Security, Vol. 9, No. 3 (Winter 1984/85), pp. 47-88; Joshua M. Epstein, "Dynamic Analysis and the Conventional Balance in Europe," International Security, Vol. 12, No. 4 (Spring 1988), pp. 154-165; Malcolm Chalmers and Lutz Unterseher, "Is There a Tank Gap? Comparing NATO and Warsaw Pact Tank Fleets," International Security, Vol. 13, No. 1 (Summer 1988), pp. 5-49; and Eliot A. Cohen, "Toward Better Net Assessment: Rethinking the European Conventional Balance," International Security, Vol. 13, No. 1 (Summer 1988), pp. 50-89.
103. Important examples in this exceptionally animated debate include John J. Mearsheimer, "Why the Soviets Can't Win Quickly in Central Europe," International Security, Vol. 7, No. 1 (Summer 1982), pp. 3-39; Barry R. Posen, "Measuring the European Conventional Balance: Coping with Complexity in Threat Assessment," International Security, Vol. 9, No. 3 (Winter 1984/85), pp. 47-88; Joshua M. Epstein, "Dynamic Analysis and the Conventional Balance in Europe," International Security, Vol. 12, No. 4 (Spring 1988), pp. 154-165; Malcolm Chalmers and Lutz Unterseher, "Is There a Tank Gap? Comparing NATO and Warsaw Pact Tank Fleets," International Security, Vol. 13, No. 1 (Summer 1988), pp. 5-49; and Eliot A. Cohen, "Toward Better Net Assessment: Rethinking the European Conventional Balance," International Security, Vol. 13, No. 1 (Summer 1988), pp. 50-89.
104. Important examples in this exceptionally animated debate include John J. Mearsheimer, "Why the Soviets Can't Win Quickly in Central Europe," International Security, Vol. 7, No. 1 (Summer 1982), pp. 3-39; Barry R. Posen, "Measuring the European Conventional Balance: Coping with Complexity in Threat Assessment," International Security, Vol. 9, No. 3 (Winter 1984/85), pp. 47-88; Joshua M. Epstein, "Dynamic Analysis and the Conventional Balance in Europe," International Security, Vol. 12, No. 4 (Spring 1988), pp. 154-165; Malcolm Chalmers and Lutz Unterseher, "Is There a Tank Gap? Comparing NATO and Warsaw Pact Tank Fleets," International Security, Vol. 13, No. 1 (Summer 1988), pp. 5-49; and Eliot A. Cohen, "Toward Better Net Assessment: Rethinking the European Conventional Balance," International Security, Vol. 13, No. 1 (Summer 1988), pp. 50-89.
105. Important examples in this exceptionally animated debate include John J. Mearsheimer, "Why the Soviets Can't Win Quickly in Central Europe," International Security, Vol. 7, No. 1 (Summer 1982), pp. 3-39; Barry R. Posen, "Measuring the European Conventional Balance: Coping with Complexity in
106. See Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971); and Morton H. Halperin, Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1974). Also relevant are Roger Hilsman, The Politics of Policy Making in Defense and Foreign Affairs (New York: Harper and Row, 1971); and Henry Kissinger and Bernard Brodie, Bureaucracy, Politics, and Strategy, Security Studies Paper No. 17 (Los Angeles: University of California, 1968).
107. See Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971); and Morton H. Halperin, Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1974). Also relevant are Roger Hilsman, The Politics of Policy Making in Defense and Foreign Affairs (New York: Harper and Row, 1971); and Henry Kissinger and Bernard Brodie, Bureaucracy, Politics, and Strategy, Security Studies Paper No. 17 (Los Angeles: University of California, 1968).
108. See Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971); and Morton H. Halperin, Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1974). Also relevant are Roger Hilsman, The Politics of Policy Making in Defense and Foreign Affairs (New York: Harper and Row, 1971); and Henry Kissinger and Bernard Brodie, Bureaucracy, Politics, and Strategy, Security Studies Paper No. 17 (Los Angeles: University of California, 1968).
109. See Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971); and Morton H. Halperin, Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1974). Also relevant are Roger Hilsman, The Politics of Policy Making in Defense and Foreign Affairs (New York: Harper and Row, 1971); and Henry Kissinger and Bernard Brodie, Bureaucracy, Politics, and Strategy, Security Studies Paper No. 17 (Los Angeles: University of California, 1968).
110. An early example is Robert J. Art, The TFX Decision: McNamara and the Military (Boston: Little, Brown, 1968). See also Ted Greenwood, Making the MIRV: A Study of Defense Decisionmaking (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1975); and Robert F. Coulam, Illusions of Choice: The FB-111 and the Problem of Weapons Acquisition Reform (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1977).
111. An early example is Robert J. Art, The TFX Decision: McNamara and the Military (Boston: Little, Brown, 1968). See also Ted Greenwood, Making the MIRV: A Study of Defense Decisionmaking (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1975); and Robert F. Coulam, Illusions of Choice: The FB-111 and the Problem of Weapons Acquisition Reform (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1977).
112. An early example is Robert J. Art, The TFX Decision: McNamara and the Military (Boston: Little, Brown, 1968). See also Ted Greenwood, Making the MIRV: A Study of Defense Decisionmaking (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1975); and Robert F. Coulam, Illusions of Choice: The FB-111 and the Problem of Weapons Acquisition Reform (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1977).
113. See, for example, Ernest R. May, Lessons of the Past: Use and Misuse of History in American Foreign Policy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1973); and Alton Frye, A Responsible Congress: The Politics of National Security (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1975).
114. See, for example, Ernest R. May, Lessons of the Past: Use and Misuse of History in American Foreign Policy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1973); and Alton Frye, A Responsible Congress: The Politics of National Security (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1975).
115. See, for example, Jeffrey Boutwell, "Politics and the Peace Movement in Germany," International Security, Vol. 7, No. 4 (Spring 1983), pp. 72-92.
116. See, for example, Steven E. Miller, "Politics over Promise: Domestic Impediments to Arms Control," International Security, Vol. 8, No. 4 (Spring 1984), pp. 67-90.
117. See Jacques S. Gansler, "Can the Defense Industry Respond to the Reagan Initiatives?" International Security, Vol. 6, No. 4 (Spring 1982), pp. 102-121; Eugene Gholz and Harvey M. Sapolsky, "Restructuring the U.S. Defense Industry," International Security, Vol. 24, No. 3 (Winter 1999/2000), pp. 5-51; and Glenn R. Fong, "Breaking New Ground or Breaking the Rules: Strategic Reorientation in U.S. Industrial Policy," International Security, Vol. 25, No. 2 (Fall 2000), pp. 152-186.
118. See Jacques S. Gansler, "Can the Defense Industry Respond to the Reagan Initiatives?" International Security, Vol. 6, No. 4 (Spring 1982), pp. 102-121; Eugene Gholz and Harvey M. Sapolsky, "Restructuring the U.S. Defense Industry," International Security, Vol. 24, No. 3 (Winter 1999/2000), pp. 5-51; and Glenn R. Fong, "Breaking New Ground or Breaking the Rules: Strategic Reorientation in U.S. Industrial Policy," International Security, Vol. 25, No. 2 (Fall 2000), pp. 152-186.
119. See Jacques S. Gansler, "Can the Defense Industry Respond to the Reagan Initiatives?" International Security, Vol. 6, No. 4 (Spring 1982), pp. 102-121; Eugene Gholz and Harvey M. Sapolsky, "Restructuring the U.S. Defense Industry," International Security, Vol. 24, No. 3 (Winter 1999/2000), pp. 5-51; and Glenn R. Fong, "Breaking New Ground or Breaking the Rules: Strategic Reorientation in U.S. Industrial Policy," International Security, Vol. 25, No. 2 (Fall 2000), pp. 152-186.
120. William J. Lynn and Barry R. Posen, "The Case for JCS Reform," International Security, Vol. 10, No. 3 (Winter 1985/86), pp. 69-97; William P. Bundy, "The National Security Process: Plus Ca Change . . . ?" International Security, Vol. 7, No. 3 (Winter 1982/83), pp. 94-109; Laurence E. Lynn, Jr., and Richard I. Smith, "Can the Secretary of Defense Make a Difference?" International Security, Vol. 7, No. 1 (Summer 1982) pp. 45-69; and Philip Odeen, "Organizing for National Security," International Security, Vol. 5, No. 1 (Summer 1980), pp. 111-129.
121. William J. Lynn and Barry R. Posen, "The Case for JCS Reform," International Security, Vol. 10, No. 3 (Winter 1985/86), pp. 69-97; William P. Bundy, "The National Security Process: Plus Ca Change . . . ?" International Security, Vol. 7, No. 3 (Winter 1982/83), pp. 94-109; Laurence E. Lynn, Jr., and Richard I. Smith, "Can the Secretary of Defense Make a Difference?" International Security, Vol. 7, No. 1 (Summer 1982) pp. 45-69; and Philip Odeen, "Organizing for National Security," International Security, Vol. 5, No. 1 (Summer 1980), pp. 111-129.
122. William J. Lynn and Barry R. Posen, "The Case for JCS Reform," International Security, Vol. 10, No. 3 (Winter 1985/86), pp. 69-97; William P. Bundy, "The National Security Process: Plus Ca Change . . . ?" International Security, Vol. 7, No. 3 (Winter 1982/83), pp. 94-109; Laurence E. Lynn, Jr., and Richard I. Smith, "Can the Secretary of Defense Make a Difference?" International Security, Vol. 7, No. 1 (Summer 1982) pp. 45-69; and Philip Odeen, "Organizing for National Security," International Security, Vol. 5, No. 1 (Summer 1980), pp. 111-129.
123. William J. Lynn and Barry R. Posen, "The Case for JCS Reform," International Security, Vol. 10, No. 3 (Winter 1985/86), pp. 69-97; William P. Bundy, "The National Security Process: Plus Ca Change . . . ?" International Security, Vol. 7, No. 3 (Winter 1982/83), pp. 94-109; Laurence E. Lynn, Jr., and Richard I. Smith, "Can the Secretary of Defense Make a Difference?" International Security, Vol. 7, No. 1 (Summer 1982) pp. 45-69; and Philip Odeen, "Organizing for National Security," International Security, Vol. 5, No. 1 (Summer 1980), pp. 111-129.
124. Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976). Jervis had introduced his ideas on this subject in "Hypotheses on Misperception," World Politics, Vol. 20, No. 3 (April 1968), pp. 454-479.
125. Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976). Jervis had introduced his ideas on this subject in "Hypotheses on Misperception," World Politics, Vol. 20, No. 3 (April 1968), pp. 454-479.
126. Prominent examples include Deborah Larson, Origins of Containment: A Psychological Explanation (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1985); and Jonathan Mercer, Reputation and International Politics (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996). See also Robert Jervis, "Deterrence and Perception," International Security, Vol. 7, No. 3 (Winter 1982/83), pp. 3-30.
127. Prominent examples include Deborah Larson, Origins of Containment: A Psychological Explanation (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1985); and Jonathan Mercer, Reputation and International Politics (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996). See also Robert Jervis, "Deterrence and Perception," International Security, Vol. 7, No. 3 (Winter 1982/83), pp. 3-30.
128. Prominent examples include Deborah Larson, Origins of Containment: A Psychological Explanation (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1985); and Jonathan Mercer, Reputation and International Politics (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996). See also Robert Jervis, "Deterrence and Perception," International Security, Vol. 7, No. 3 (Winter 1982/83), pp. 3-30.
129. Jervis's original discussion of these issues is found in the famous chapter 3 of Perception and Misperception in International Politics, pp. 58-113. Jervis further developed these ideas in "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma," World Politics, Vol. 30, No. 2 (January 1978), pp. 167-214.
130. Jervis's original discussion of these issues is found in the famous chapter 3 of Perception and Misperception in International Politics, pp. 58-113. Jervis further developed these ideas in "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma," World Politics, Vol. 30, No. 2 (January 1978), pp. 167-214.
131. These ideas are most extensively developed in Stephen Van Evera, Causes of War: Power and the Roots of Conflict (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1999). See also Stephen Van Evera, "Offense, Defense, and the Causes of War," International Security, Vol. 22, No. 4 (Spring 1998), pp. 5-43.
132. These ideas are most extensively developed in Stephen Van Evera, Causes of War: Power and the Roots of Conflict (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1999). See also Stephen Van Evera, "Offense, Defense, and the Causes of War," International Security, Vol. 22, No. 4 (Spring 1998), pp. 5-43.
133. Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1979).
134. Some 500 pages of this debate, as it appeared in International Security, are collected in Michael E. Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller, eds., The Perils of Anarchy: Contemporary Realism and International Security (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1995).
135. Jeffrey W. Legro and Andrew Moravcsik, "Is Anybody Still a Realist?" International Security, Vol. 24, No. 2 (Fall 1999), p. 5.
136. Kenneth N. Waltz, "Structural Realism after the Cold War," International Security, Vol. 25, No. 1 (Summer 2000), pp. 6, 27.
137. Jeffrey Taliaferro, "Security Seeking under Anarchy: Defensive Realism Revisited," International Security, Vol. 25, No. 3 (Winter 2000/01), p. 131.
138. The phrase is cited in David Abel, "War's Fall from Grace," Boston Globe, January 30, 2001, pp. C1, C5.
139. Baldwin, "Security Studies and the End of the Cold War," pp. 135-140. Baldwin argues for a "reintegration" of security studies with international politics and foreign policy studies. I suspect that most who regard themselves as specialists in international security believe that these fields have always been closely linked.
140. For an optimistic assessment, see Charles A. Kupchan and Clifford A. Kupchan, "Concerts, Collective Security, and the Future of Europe," International Security, Vol. 16, No. 1 (Summer 1991), pp. 114-161; and Charles A. Kupchan and Clifford A. Kupchan, "The Promise of Collective Security," International Security, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Summer 1995), pp. 52-61.
141. For an optimistic assessment, see Charles A. Kupchan and Clifford A. Kupchan, "Concerts, Collective Security, and the Future of Europe," International Security, Vol. 16, No. 1 (Summer 1991), pp. 114-161; and Charles A. Kupchan and Clifford A. Kupchan, "The Promise of Collective Security," International Security, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Summer 1995), pp. 52-61.
142. For a skeptical answer, see Richard K. Betts, "Systems for Peace or Causes of War? Collective Security, Arms Control, and the New Europe," International Security, Vol. 17, No. 1 (Summer 1992), pp. 5-43.
143. See, for example, Robert Jervis, "The Future of World Politics: Will It Resemble the Past?" International Security, Vol. 16, No. 3 (Winter 1991/92), pp. 39-73; Kenneth N. Waltz, "The Emerging Structure of International Politics," International Security, Vol. 18, No. 2 (Fall 1993), pp. 44-79; and Carl Kaysen, "Is War Obsolete? A Review Essay," International Security, Vol. 14, No. 4 (Spring 1990), pp. 42-64.
144. See, for example, Robert Jervis, "The Future of World Politics: Will It Resemble the Past?" International Security, Vol. 16, No. 3 (Winter 1991/92), pp. 39-73; Kenneth N. Waltz, "The Emerging Structure of International Politics," International Security, Vol. 18, No. 2 (Fall 1993), pp. 44-79; and Carl Kaysen, "Is War Obsolete? A Review Essay," International Security, Vol. 14, No. 4 (Spring 1990), pp. 42-64.
145. See, for example, Robert Jervis, "The Future of World Politics: Will It Resemble the Past?" International Security, Vol. 16, No. 3 (Winter 1991/92), pp. 39-73; Kenneth N. Waltz, "The Emerging Structure of International Politics," International Security, Vol. 18, No. 2 (Fall 1993), pp. 44-79; and Carl Kaysen, "Is War Obsolete? A Review Essay," International Security, Vol. 14, No. 4 (Spring 1990), pp. 42-64.
146. See Barry R. Posen and Andrew L. Ross, "Competing Visions for U.S. Grand Strategy," International Security, Vol. 21, No. 3 (Winter 1996/97), pp. 5-53, for an analysis of the spectrum of options.
147. A range of arguments on the choice of America's post-Cold War grand strategy can be found in Michael E. Brown, Owen R. Coté, Jr., Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller, eds., America's Strategic Choices, rev. ed. (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2000).
148. For diverse views on this question, see Samuel P. Huntington, "Why International Primacy Matters," International Security, Vol. 17, No. 4 (Spring 1993), pp. 68-83; Robert Jervis, "International Primacy: Is the Game Worth the Candle?" ibid., pp. 52-67; Christopher Layne, "The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Arise," ibid., pp. 5-51; Michael Mastanduno, "Preserving the Unipolar Moment: Realist Theories and U.S. Grand Strategy after the Cold War," International Security, Vol. 21, No. 4 (Spring 1997), pp. 49-88; William C. Wohlforth, "The Stability of a Unipolar World," International Security, Vol. 24, No. 1 (Summer 1999), pp. 5-41; and Charles A. Kupchan, "After Pax Americana: Benign Power, Regional Integration, and the Sources of a Stable Multipolarity," International Security, Vol. 23, No. 2 (Fall 1998), pp. 40-79.
149. For diverse views on this question, see Samuel P. Huntington, "Why International Primacy Matters," International Security, Vol. 17, No. 4 (Spring 1993), pp. 68-83; Robert Jervis, "International Primacy: Is the Game Worth the Candle?" ibid., pp. 52-67; Christopher Layne, "The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Arise," ibid., pp. 5-51; Michael Mastanduno, "Preserving the Unipolar Moment: Realist Theories and U.S. Grand Strategy after the Cold War," International Security, Vol. 21, No. 4 (Spring 1997), pp. 49-88; William C. Wohlforth, "The Stability of a Unipolar World," International Security, Vol. 24, No. 1 (Summer 1999), pp. 5-41; and Charles A. Kupchan, "After Pax Americana: Benign Power, Regional Integration, and the Sources of a Stable Multipolarity," International Security, Vol. 23, No. 2 (Fall 1998), pp. 40-79.
150. For diverse views on this question, see Samuel P. Huntington, "Why International Primacy Matters," International Security, Vol. 17, No. 4 (Spring 1993), pp. 68-83; Robert Jervis, "International Primacy: Is the Game Worth the Candle?" ibid., pp. 52-67; Christopher Layne, "The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Arise," ibid., pp. 5-51; Michael Mastanduno, "Preserving the Unipolar Moment: Realist Theories and U.S. Grand Strategy after the Cold War," International Security, Vol. 21, No. 4 (Spring 1997), pp. 49-88; William C. Wohlforth, "The Stability of a Unipolar World," International Security, Vol. 24, No. 1 (Summer 1999), pp. 5-41; and Charles A. Kupchan, "After Pax Americana: Benign Power, Regional Integration, and the Sources of a Stable Multipolarity," International Security, Vol. 23, No. 2 (Fall 1998), pp. 40-79.
151. For diverse views on this question, see Samuel P. Huntington, "Why International Primacy Matters," International Security, Vol. 17, No. 4 (Spring 1993), pp. 68-83; Robert Jervis, "International Primacy: Is the Game Worth the Candle?" ibid., pp. 52-67; Christopher Layne, "The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Arise," ibid., pp. 5-51; Michael Mastanduno, "Preserving the Unipolar Moment: Realist Theories and U.S. Grand Strategy after the Cold War," International Security, Vol. 21, No. 4 (Spring 1997), pp. 49-88; William C. Wohlforth, "The Stability of a Unipolar World," International Security, Vol. 24, No. 1 (Summer 1999), pp. 5-41; and Charles A. Kupchan, "After Pax Americana: Benign Power, Regional Integration, and the Sources of a Stable Multipolarity," International Security, Vol. 23, No. 2 (Fall 1998), pp. 40-79.
152. For diverse views on this question, see Samuel P. Huntington, "Why International Primacy Matters," International Security, Vol. 17, No. 4 (Spring 1993), pp. 68-83; Robert Jervis, "International Primacy: Is the Game Worth the Candle?" ibid., pp. 52-67; Christopher Layne, "The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Arise," ibid., pp. 5-51; Michael Mastanduno, "Preserving the Unipolar Moment: Realist Theories and U.S. Grand Strategy after the Cold War," International Security, Vol. 21, No. 4 (Spring 1997), pp. 49-88; William C. Wohlforth, "The Stability of a Unipolar World," International Security, Vol. 24, No. 1 (Summer 1999), pp. 5-41; and Charles A. Kupchan, "After Pax Americana: Benign Power, Regional Integration, and the Sources of a Stable Multipolarity," International Security, Vol. 23, No. 2 (Fall 1998), pp. 40-79.
153. For diverse views on this question, see Samuel P. Huntington, "Why International Primacy Matters," International Security, Vol. 17, No. 4 (Spring 1993), pp. 68-83; Robert Jervis, "International Primacy: Is the Game Worth the Candle?" ibid., pp. 52-67; Christopher Layne, "The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Arise," ibid., pp. 5-51; Michael Mastanduno, "Preserving the Unipolar Moment: Realist Theories and U.S. Grand Strategy after the Cold War," International Security, Vol. 21, No. 4 (Spring 1997), pp. 49-88; William C. Wohlforth, "The Stability of a Unipolar World," International Security, Vol. 24, No. 1 (Summer 1999), pp. 5-41; and Charles A. Kupchan, "After Pax Americana: Benign Power, Regional Integration, and the Sources of a Stable Multipolarity," International Security, Vol. 23, No. 2 (Fall 1998), pp. 40-79.
154. One of the most widely cited, reproduced, and criticized IS articles argued that Europe was likely to be entering a dangerous, unstable, and potentially violent period. See John J. Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War," International Security, Vol. 15, No. 1 (Summer 1990), pp. 5-56. Prominent dissents from the Mearsheimer interpretation include Stephen Van Evera, "Primed for Peace: Europe after the Cold War," International Security, Vol. 15, No. 3 (Winter 1990/91), pp. 7-57; and Jack Snyder, "Averting Anarchy in the New Europe," International Security, Vol. 14, No. 4 (Spring 1990), pp. 5-41. These and related essays are collected in Sean M. Lynn-Jones, ed., The Cold War and After: Prospects for Peace (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1991); and Sean M. Lynn-Jones and Steven E. Miller, eds., The Cold War and After: Prospects for Peace, exp. ed. (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1993). These volumes are the all-time best-sellers among the anthologies that International Security has produced, indicating the keen interest in these topics.
155. One of the most widely cited, reproduced, and criticized IS articles argued that Europe was likely to be entering a dangerous, unstable, and potentially violent period. See John J. Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War," International Security, Vol. 15, No. 1 (Summer 1990), pp. 5-56. Prominent dissents from the Mearsheimer interpretation include Stephen Van Evera, "Primed for Peace: Europe after the Cold War," International Security, Vol. 15, No. 3 (Winter 1990/91), pp. 7-57; and Jack Snyder, "Averting Anarchy in the New Europe," International Security, Vol. 14, No. 4 (Spring 1990), pp. 5-41. These and related essays are collected in Sean M. Lynn-Jones, ed., The Cold War and After: Prospects for Peace (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1991); and Sean M. Lynn-Jones and Steven E. Miller, eds., The Cold War and After: Prospects for Peace, exp. ed. (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1993). These volumes are the all-time best-sellers among the anthologies that International Security has produced, indicating the keen interest in these topics.
156. One of the most widely cited, reproduced, and criticized IS articles argued that Europe was likely to be entering a dangerous, unstable, and potentially violent period. See John J. Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War," International Security, Vol. 15, No. 1 (Summer 1990), pp. 5-56. Prominent dissents from the Mearsheimer interpretation include Stephen Van Evera, "Primed for Peace: Europe after the Cold War," International Security, Vol. 15, No. 3 (Winter 1990/91), pp. 7-57; and Jack Snyder, "Averting Anarchy in the New Europe," International Security, Vol. 14, No. 4 (Spring 1990), pp. 5-41. These and related essays are collected in Sean M. Lynn-Jones, ed., The Cold War and After: Prospects for Peace (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1991); and Sean M. Lynn-Jones and Steven E. Miller, eds., The Cold War and After: Prospects for Peace, exp. ed. (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1993). These volumes are the all-time best-sellers among the anthologies that International Security has produced, indicating the keen interest in these topics.
157. One of the most widely cited, reproduced, and criticized IS articles argued that Europe was likely to be entering a dangerous, unstable, and potentially violent period. See John J. Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War," International Security, Vol. 15, No. 1 (Summer 1990), pp. 5-56. Prominent dissents from the Mearsheimer interpretation include Stephen Van Evera, "Primed for Peace: Europe after the Cold War," International Security, Vol. 15, No. 3 (Winter 1990/91), pp. 7-57; and Jack Snyder, "Averting Anarchy in the New Europe," International Security, Vol. 14, No. 4 (Spring 1990), pp. 5-41. These and related essays are collected in Sean M. Lynn-Jones, ed., The Cold War and After: Prospects for Peace (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1991); and Sean M. Lynn-Jones and Steven E. Miller, eds., The Cold War and After: Prospects for Peace, exp. ed. (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1993). These volumes are the all-time best-sellers among the anthologies that International Security has produced, indicating the keen interest in these topics.
158. One of the most widely cited, reproduced, and criticized IS articles argued that Europe was likely to be entering a dangerous, unstable, and potentially violent period. See John J. Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War," International Security, Vol. 15, No. 1 (Summer 1990), pp. 5-56. Prominent dissents from the Mearsheimer interpretation include Stephen Van Evera, "Primed for Peace: Europe after the Cold War," International Security, Vol. 15, No. 3 (Winter 1990/91), pp. 7-57; and Jack Snyder, "Averting Anarchy in the New Europe," International Security, Vol. 14, No. 4 (Spring 1990), pp. 5-41. These and related essays are collected in Sean M. Lynn-Jones, ed., The Cold War and After: Prospects for Peace (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1991); and Sean M. Lynn-Jones and Steven E. Miller, eds., The Cold War and After: Prospects for Peace, exp. ed. (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1993). These volumes are the all-time best-sellers among the anthologies that International Security has produced, indicating the keen interest in these topics.
159. See Richard K. Betts, "Wealth, Power, and Instability: East Asia and the United States after the Cold War," International Security, Vol. 18, No. 3 (Winter 1993/94), pp. 34-77; and Aaron Friedberg, "Ripe for Rivalry: Prospects for Peace in a Multipolar Asia," International Security, Vol. 18, No. 3 (Winter 1993/94), pp. 5-33. See also the collection of IS articles in Michael E. Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller, eds., East Asian Security (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1996).
160. See Richard K. Betts, "Wealth, Power, and Instability: East Asia and the United States after the Cold War," International Security, Vol. 18, No. 3 (Winter 1993/94), pp. 34-77; and Aaron Friedberg, "Ripe for Rivalry: Prospects for Peace in a Multipolar Asia," International Security, Vol. 18, No. 3 (Winter 1993/94), pp. 5-33. See also the collection of IS articles in Michael E. Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller, eds., East Asian Security (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1996).
161. See Richard K. Betts, "Wealth, Power, and Instability: East Asia and the United States after the Cold War," International Security, Vol. 18, No. 3 (Winter 1993/94), pp. 34-77; and Aaron Friedberg, "Ripe for Rivalry: Prospects for Peace in a Multipolar Asia," International Security, Vol. 18, No. 3 (Winter 1993/94), pp. 5-33. See also the collection of IS articles in Michael E. Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller, eds., East Asian Security (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1996).
162. See, most recently, Thomas J. Christensen, "Posing Problems without Catching Up: China's Rise and Challenges for U.S. Security Policy," International Security, Vol. 25, No. 4 (Spring 2001), pp. 5-40. Other relevant articles include Gerald Segal, "East Asia and the 'Constrainment' of China," International Security, Vol. 20, No. 4 (Spring 1996), pp. 107-135; David Shambaugh, "Containment or Engagement of China? Calculating Beijing's Responses," International Security, Vol. 21, No. 2 (Fall 1996), pp. 180-209; Michael O'Hanlon, "Why China Cannot Conquer Taiwan," International Security, Vol. 25, No. 2 (Fall 2000), pp. 51-86; Robert S. Ross, "The 1995-96 Taiwan Strait Confrontation: Coercion, Credibility, and the Use of Force," International Security, Vol. 25, No. 2 (Fall 2000), pp. 87-123; and Alastair Iain Johnston, "China's New 'Old Thinking': The Concept of Limited Deterrence," International Security, Vol. 20, No. 3 (Winter 1995/96), pp. 5-42. For a collection of IS articles on China, see Michael E. Brown, Owen R. Coté, Jr., Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller, The Rise of China (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2000).
163. See, most recently, Thomas J. Christensen, "Posing Problems without Catching Up: China's Rise and Challenges for U.S. Security Policy," International Security, Vol. 25, No. 4 (Spring 2001), pp. 5-40. Other relevant articles include Gerald Segal, "East Asia and the 'Constrainment' of China," International Security, Vol. 20, No. 4 (Spring 1996), pp. 107-135; David Shambaugh, "Containment or Engagement of China? Calculating Beijing's Responses," International Security, Vol. 21, No. 2 (Fall 1996), pp. 180-209; Michael O'Hanlon, "Why China Cannot Conquer Taiwan," International Security, Vol. 25, No. 2 (Fall 2000), pp. 51-86; Robert S. Ross, "The 1995-96 Taiwan Strait Confrontation: Coercion, Credibility, and the Use of Force," International Security, Vol. 25, No. 2 (Fall 2000), pp. 87-123; and Alastair Iain Johnston, "China's New 'Old Thinking': The Concept of Limited Deterrence," International Security, Vol. 20, No. 3 (Winter 1995/96), pp. 5-42. For a collection of IS articles on China, see Michael E. Brown, Owen R. Coté, Jr., Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller, The Rise of China (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2000).
164. See, most recently, Thomas J. Christensen, "Posing Problems without Catching Up: China's Rise and Challenges for U.S. Security Policy," International Security, Vol. 25, No. 4 (Spring 2001), pp. 5-40. Other relevant articles include Gerald Segal, "East Asia and the 'Constrainment' of China," International Security, Vol. 20, No. 4 (Spring 1996), pp. 107-135; David Shambaugh, "Containment or Engagement of China? Calculating Beijing's Responses," International Security, Vol. 21, No. 2 (Fall 1996), pp. 180-209; Michael O'Hanlon, "Why China Cannot Conquer Taiwan," International Security, Vol. 25, No. 2 (Fall 2000), pp. 51-86; Robert S. Ross, "The 1995-96 Taiwan Strait Confrontation: Coercion, Credibility, and the Use of Force," International Security, Vol. 25, No. 2 (Fall 2000), pp. 87-123; and Alastair Iain Johnston, "China's New 'Old Thinking': The Concept of Limited Deterrence," International Security, Vol. 20, No. 3 (Winter 1995/96), pp. 5-42. For a collection of IS articles on China, see Michael E. Brown, Owen R. Coté, Jr., Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller, The Rise of China (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2000).
165. See, most recently, Thomas J. Christensen, "Posing Problems without Catching Up: China's Rise and Challenges for U.S. Security Policy," International Security, Vol. 25, No. 4 (Spring 2001), pp. 5-40. Other relevant articles include Gerald Segal, "East Asia and the 'Constrainment' of China," International Security, Vol. 20, No. 4 (Spring 1996), pp. 107-135; David Shambaugh, "Containment or Engagement of China? Calculating Beijing's Responses," International Security, Vol. 21, No. 2 (Fall 1996), pp. 180-209; Michael O'Hanlon, "Why China Cannot Conquer Taiwan," International Security, Vol. 25, No. 2 (Fall 2000), pp. 51-86; Robert S. Ross, "The 1995-96 Taiwan Strait Confrontation: Coercion, Credibility, and the Use of Force," International Security, Vol. 25, No. 2 (Fall 2000), pp. 87-123; and Alastair Iain Johnston, "China's New 'Old Thinking': The Concept of Limited Deterrence," International Security, Vol. 20, No. 3 (Winter 1995/96), pp. 5-42. For a collection of IS articles on China, see Michael E. Brown, Owen R. Coté, Jr., Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller, The Rise of China (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2000).
166. See, most recently, Thomas J. Christensen, "Posing Problems without Catching Up: China's Rise and Challenges for U.S. Security Policy," International Security, Vol. 25, No. 4 (Spring 2001), pp. 5-40. Other relevant articles include Gerald Segal, "East Asia and the 'Constrainment' of China," International Security, Vol. 20, No. 4 (Spring 1996), pp. 107-135; David Shambaugh, "Containment or Engagement of China? Calculating Beijing's Responses," International Security, Vol. 21, No. 2 (Fall 1996), pp. 180-209; Michael O'Hanlon, "Why China Cannot Conquer Taiwan," International Security, Vol. 25, No. 2 (Fall 2000), pp. 51-86; Robert S. Ross, "The 1995-96 Taiwan Strait Confrontation: Coercion, Credibility, and the Use of Force," International Security, Vol. 25, No. 2 (Fall 2000), pp. 87-123; and Alastair Iain Johnston, "China's New 'Old Thinking': The Concept of Limited Deterrence," International Security, Vol. 20, No. 3 (Winter 1995/96), pp. 5-42. For a collection of IS articles on China, see Michael E. Brown, Owen R. Coté, Jr., Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller, The Rise of China (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2000).
167. See, most recently, Thomas J. Christensen, "Posing Problems without Catching Up: China's Rise and Challenges for U.S. Security Policy," International Security, Vol. 25, No. 4 (Spring 2001), pp. 5-40. Other relevant articles include Gerald Segal, "East Asia and the 'Constrainment' of China," International Security, Vol. 20, No. 4 (Spring 1996), pp. 107-135; David Shambaugh, "Containment or Engagement of China? Calculating Beijing's Responses," International Security, Vol. 21, No. 2 (Fall 1996), pp. 180-209; Michael O'Hanlon, "Why China Cannot Conquer Taiwan," International Security, Vol. 25, No. 2 (Fall 2000), pp. 51-86; Robert S. Ross, "The 1995-96 Taiwan Strait Confrontation: Coercion, Credibility, and the Use of Force," International Security, Vol. 25, No. 2 (Fall 2000), pp. 87-123; and Alastair Iain Johnston, "China's New 'Old Thinking': The Concept of Limited Deterrence," International Security, Vol. 20, No. 3 (Winter 1995/96), pp. 5-42. For a collection of IS articles on China, see Michael E. Brown, Owen R. Coté, Jr., Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller, The Rise of China (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2000).
168. See, most recently, Thomas J. Christensen, "Posing Problems without Catching Up: China's Rise and Challenges for U.S. Security Policy," International Security, Vol. 25, No. 4 (Spring 2001), pp. 5-40. Other relevant articles include Gerald Segal, "East Asia and the 'Constrainment' of China," International Security, Vol. 20, No. 4 (Spring 1996), pp. 107-135; David Shambaugh, "Containment or Engagement of China? Calculating Beijing's Responses," International Security, Vol. 21, No. 2 (Fall 1996), pp. 180-209; Michael O'Hanlon, "Why China Cannot Conquer Taiwan," International Security, Vol. 25, No. 2 (Fall 2000), pp. 51-86; Robert S. Ross, "The 1995-96 Taiwan Strait Confrontation: Coercion, Credibility, and the Use of Force," International Security, Vol. 25, No. 2 (Fall 2000), pp. 87-123; and Alastair Iain Johnston, "China's New 'Old Thinking': The Concept of Limited Deterrence," International Security, Vol. 20, No. 3 (Winter 1995/96), pp. 5-42. For a collection of IS articles on China, see Michael E. Brown, Owen R. Coté, Jr., Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller, The Rise of China (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2000).
169. See, for example, Lawrence Freedman and Efraim Karsh, "How Kuwait Was Won: Strategy in the Gulf War," International Security, Vol. 16, No. 2 (Fall 1991), pp. 5-41; Stephen Biddle, "Victory Misunderstood: What the Gulf War Tells Us about the Future of Conflict," International Security, Vol. 21, No. 2 (Fall 1996), pp. 139-179; Daryl G. Press, "Lessons from Ground Combat in the Gulf: The Impact of Training and Technology," International Security, Vol. 22, No. 2 (Fall 1997), pp. 137-146; and Adam Roberts, "The Laws of War in the 1990-91 Gulf Conflict," International Security, Vol. 18, No. 3 (Winter 1993/94), pp. 134-181.
170. See, for example, Lawrence Freedman and Efraim Karsh, "How Kuwait Was Won: Strategy in the Gulf War," International Security, Vol. 16, No. 2 (Fall 1991), pp. 5-41; Stephen Biddle, "Victory Misunderstood: What the Gulf War Tells Us about the Future of Conflict," International Security, Vol. 21, No. 2 (Fall 1996), pp. 139-179; Daryl G. Press, "Lessons from Ground Combat in the Gulf: The Impact of Training and Technology," International Security, Vol. 22, No. 2 (Fall 1997), pp. 137-146; and Adam Roberts, "The Laws of War in the 1990-91 Gulf Conflict," International Security, Vol. 18, No. 3 (Winter 1993/94), pp. 134-181.
171. See, for example, Lawrence Freedman and Efraim Karsh, "How Kuwait Was Won: Strategy in the Gulf War," International Security, Vol. 16, No. 2 (Fall 1991), pp. 5-41; Stephen Biddle, "Victory Misunderstood: What the Gulf War Tells Us about the Future of Conflict," International Security, Vol. 21, No. 2 (Fall 1996), pp. 139-179; Daryl G. Press, "Lessons from Ground Combat in the Gulf: The Impact of Training and Technology," International Security, Vol. 22, No. 2 (Fall 1997), pp. 137-146; and Adam Roberts, "The Laws of War in the 1990-91 Gulf Conflict," International Security, Vol. 18, No. 3 (Winter 1993/94), pp. 134-181.
172. See, for example, Lawrence Freedman and Efraim Karsh, "How Kuwait Was Won: Strategy in the Gulf War," International Security, Vol. 16, No. 2 (Fall 1991), pp. 5-41; Stephen Biddle, "Victory Misunderstood: What the Gulf War Tells Us about the Future of Conflict," International Security, Vol. 21, No. 2 (Fall 1996), pp. 139-179; Daryl G. Press, "Lessons from Ground Combat in the Gulf: The Impact of Training and Technology," International Security, Vol. 22, No. 2 (Fall 1997), pp. 137-146; and Adam Roberts, "The Laws of War in the 1990-91 Gulf Conflict," International Security, Vol. 18, No. 3 (Winter 1993/94), pp. 134-181.
173. See, for example, Jane M.O. Sharp, "Dayton Report Card," International Security, Vol. 22, No. 3 (Winter 1997/98), pp. 101-137; and Barry R. Posen, "The War for Kosovo: Serbia's Political-Military Strategy," International Security, Vol. 24, No. 4 (Spring 2000), pp. 39-84.
174. See, for example, Jane M.O. Sharp, "Dayton Report Card," International Security, Vol. 22, No. 3 (Winter 1997/98), pp. 101-137; and Barry R. Posen, "The War for Kosovo: Serbia's Political-Military Strategy," International Security, Vol. 24, No. 4 (Spring 2000), pp. 39-84.
175. One approach to this issue is Stephen Van Evera, "Hypotheses on Nationalism and War," International Security, Vol. 18, No. 4 (Spring 1994), pp. 5-39. See also Jack Snyder and Karen Ballentine, "Nationalism and the Marketplace of Ideas," International Security, Vol. 21, No. 2 (Fall 1996), pp. 5-40; and John Mueller, "The Banality of 'Ethnic War,'" International Security, Vol. 25, No. 1 (Summer 2000), pp. 42-70.
176. One approach to this issue is Stephen Van Evera, "Hypotheses on Nationalism and War," International Security, Vol. 18, No. 4 (Spring 1994), pp. 5-39. See also Jack Snyder and Karen Ballentine, "Nationalism and the Marketplace of Ideas," International Security, Vol. 21, No. 2 (Fall 1996), pp. 5-40; and John Mueller, "The Banality of 'Ethnic War,'" International Security, Vol. 25, No. 1 (Summer 2000), pp. 42-70.
177. One approach to this issue is Stephen Van Evera, "Hypotheses on Nationalism and War," International Security, Vol. 18, No. 4 (Spring 1994), pp. 5-39. See also Jack Snyder and Karen Ballentine, "Nationalism and the Marketplace of Ideas," International Security, Vol. 21, No. 2 (Fall 1996), pp. 5-40; and John Mueller, "The Banality of 'Ethnic War,'" International Security, Vol. 25, No. 1 (Summer 2000), pp. 42-70.
178. For a controversial answer to this question, see Chaim Kaufmann, "Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars," International Security, Vol. 20, No. 4 (Spring 1996), pp. 136-175.
179. IS articles in this genre have been collected in Michael E. Brown, Owen R. Coté, Jr., Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller, eds., Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1997); and in a new edition, Michael E. Brown, Owen R. Coté, Jr., Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller, eds., Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict, rev. ed. (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2001).
180. IS articles in this genre have been collected in Michael E. Brown, Owen R. Coté, Jr., Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller, eds., Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1997); and in a new edition, Michael E. Brown, Owen R. Coté, Jr., Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller, eds., Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict, rev. ed. (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2001).
181. See Robert A. Pape, "Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work," International Security, Vol. 22, No 2 (Fall 1997), pp. 90-136; Kimberly Ann Elliott, "The Sanctions Glass: Half Full or Completely Empty?" International Security, Vol. 23, No. 1 (Summer 1998), pp. 50-65; David A. Baldwin, "Evaluating Economic Sanctions," International Security, Vol. 23, No. 2 (Fall 1998), pp. 189-198; and David A. Baldwin, "The Sanctions Debate and the Logic of Choice," International Security, Vol. 24, No. 3 (Winter 1999/2000), pp. 80-107.
182. See Robert A. Pape, "Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work," International Security, Vol. 22, No 2 (Fall 1997), pp. 90-136; Kimberly Ann Elliott, "The Sanctions Glass: Half Full or Completely Empty?" International Security, Vol. 23, No. 1 (Summer 1998), pp. 50-65; David A. Baldwin, "Evaluating Economic Sanctions," International Security, Vol. 23, No. 2 (Fall 1998), pp. 189-198; and David A. Baldwin, "The Sanctions Debate and the Logic of Choice," International Security, Vol. 24, No. 3 (Winter 1999/2000), pp. 80-107.
183. See Robert A. Pape, "Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work," International Security, Vol. 22, No 2 (Fall 1997), pp. 90-136; Kimberly Ann Elliott, "The Sanctions Glass: Half Full or Completely Empty?" International Security, Vol. 23, No. 1 (Summer 1998), pp. 50-65; David A. Baldwin, "Evaluating Economic Sanctions," International Security, Vol. 23, No. 2 (Fall 1998), pp. 189-198; and David A. Baldwin, "The Sanctions Debate and the Logic of Choice," International Security, Vol. 24, No. 3 (Winter 1999/2000), pp. 80-107.
184. See Robert A. Pape, "Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work," International Security, Vol. 22, No 2 (Fall 1997), pp. 90-136; Kimberly Ann Elliott, "The Sanctions Glass: Half Full or Completely Empty?" International Security, Vol. 23, No. 1 (Summer 1998), pp. 50-65; David A. Baldwin, "Evaluating Economic Sanctions," International Security, Vol. 23, No. 2 (Fall 1998), pp. 189-198; and David A. Baldwin, "The Sanctions Debate and the Logic of Choice," International Security, Vol. 24, No. 3 (Winter 1999/2000), pp. 80-107.
185. See Ward Thomas, "Norms and Security: The Case of International Assassination," International Security, Vol. 25, No. 1 (Summer 2000), pp. 105-133.
186. See, for example, Etel Solingen, "The Political Economy of Nuclear Restraint," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 2 (Fall 1994), pp. 126-169.
187. See Thomas Risse-Kappen, "Did 'Peace through Strength' End the Cold War? Lessons from INF," International Security, Vol. 16, No. 1 (Summer 1991), pp. 162-188.
188. For early examples, see Robert L. Paarlberg, "Food, Oil, and Coercive Resource Diplomacy," International Security, Vol. 3, No. 2 (Fall 1978), pp. 3-19; and David Deese, "Energy: Economics, Politics, and Security," International Security, Vol. 4, No. 3 (Winter 1979/80), pp. 140-153.
189. For early examples, see Robert L. Paarlberg, "Food, Oil, and Coercive Resource Diplomacy," International Security, Vol. 3, No. 2 (Fall 1978), pp. 3-19; and David Deese, "Energy: Economics, Politics, and Security," International Security, Vol. 4, No. 3 (Winter 1979/80), pp. 140-153.
190. Examples include Thomas F. Homer-Dixon, "On the Threshold: Environmental Changes as Causes of Acute Conflict," International Security, Vol. 16, No. 2 (Fall 1991), pp. 76-116; Thomas F. Homer-Dixon, "Environmental Scarcities and Violent Conflict: Evidence from Cases," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 1 (Summer 1994), pp. 5-40; Marc A. Levy, "Is the Environment a National Security Issue?" International Security, Vol. 20, No. 2 (Fall 1995), pp. 35-62; Peter H. Gleick, "Water and Conflict: Fresh Water Resources and International Security," International Security, Vol. 18, No. 1 (Summer 1993), pp. 79-112; and Colin H. Kahl, "Population Growth, Environmental Degradation, and State-Sponsored Violence: The Case of Kenya, 1991-93," International Security, Vol. 23, No. 2 (Fall 1998), pp. 80-119.
191. Examples include Thomas F. Homer-Dixon, "On the Threshold: Environmental Changes as Causes of Acute Conflict," International Security, Vol. 16, No. 2 (Fall 1991), pp. 76-116; Thomas F. Homer-Dixon, "Environmental Scarcities and Violent Conflict: Evidence from Cases," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 1 (Summer 1994), pp. 5-40; Marc A. Levy, "Is the Environment a National Security Issue?" International Security, Vol. 20, No. 2 (Fall 1995), pp. 35-62; Peter H. Gleick, "Water and Conflict: Fresh Water Resources and International Security," International Security, Vol. 18, No. 1 (Summer 1993), pp. 79-112; and Colin H. Kahl, "Population Growth, Environmental Degradation, and State-Sponsored Violence: The Case of Kenya, 1991-93," International Security, Vol. 23, No. 2 (Fall 1998), pp. 80-119.
192. Examples include Thomas F. Homer-Dixon, "On the Threshold: Environmental Changes as Causes of Acute Conflict," International Security, Vol. 16, No. 2 (Fall 1991), pp. 76-116; Thomas F. Homer-Dixon, "Environmental Scarcities and Violent Conflict: Evidence from Cases," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 1 (Summer 1994), pp. 5-40; Marc A. Levy, "Is the Environment a National Security Issue?" International Security, Vol. 20, No. 2 (Fall 1995), pp. 35-62; Peter H. Gleick, "Water and Conflict: Fresh Water Resources and International Security," International Security, Vol. 18, No. 1 (Summer 1993), pp. 79-112; and Colin H. Kahl, "Population Growth, Environmental Degradation, and State-Sponsored Violence: The Case of Kenya, 1991-93," International Security, Vol. 23, No. 2 (Fall 1998), pp. 80-119.
193. Examples include Thomas F. Homer-Dixon, "On the Threshold: Environmental Changes as Causes of Acute Conflict," International Security, Vol. 16, No. 2 (Fall 1991), pp. 76-116; Thomas F. Homer-Dixon, "Environmental Scarcities and Violent Conflict: Evidence from Cases," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 1 (Summer 1994), pp. 5-40; Marc A. Levy, "Is the Environment a National Security Issue?" International Security, Vol. 20, No. 2 (Fall 1995), pp. 35-62; Peter H. Gleick, "Water and Conflict: Fresh Water Resources and International Security," International Security, Vol. 18, No. 1 (Summer 1993), pp. 79-112; and Colin H. Kahl, "Population Growth, Environmental Degradation, and State-Sponsored Violence: The Case of Kenya, 1991-93," International Security, Vol. 23, No. 2 (Fall 1998), pp. 80-119.
194. Examples include Thomas F. Homer-Dixon, "On the Threshold: Environmental Changes as Causes of Acute Conflict," International Security, Vol. 16, No. 2 (Fall 1991), pp. 76-116; Thomas F. Homer-Dixon, "Environmental Scarcities and Violent Conflict: Evidence from Cases," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 1 (Summer 1994), pp. 5-40; Marc A. Levy, "Is the Environment a National Security Issue?" International Security, Vol. 20, No. 2 (Fall 1995), pp. 35-62; Peter H. Gleick, "Water and Conflict: Fresh Water Resources and International Security," International Security, Vol. 18, No. 1 (Summer 1993), pp. 79-112; and Colin H. Kahl, "Population Growth, Environmental Degradation, and State-Sponsored Violence: The Case of Kenya, 1991-93," International Security, Vol. 23, No. 2 (Fall 1998), pp. 80-119.
195. As a general rule, International Security does not commission work (though in rare instances there are exceptions to this rule). Even many of the book review essays published in the journal come to us unbidden. Hence the contents of the journal must be drawn from the large number of unsolicited manuscripts sent to us. With the help of anonymous external reviews, the editors must winnow this pool of submissions down to twenty to twenty-five published articles per year. With the exception of commissioned articles, all articles appearing in International Security have been subjected to double blind external review. We could not operate in this manner without the voluntary help of large numbers of individuals in the field, many of whom do yeoman's work by reviewing numerous articles and reviewing them well. We are grateful to all who have contributed in this way. (Unfortunately, you can probably count on hearing from us again.) Those interested in more detail about how IS operates and how to prepare essays for submission should consult Teresa Pelton Johnson, "Writing for International Security: A Contributor's Guide," International Security, Vol. 16, No. 2 (Fall 1991), pp. 171-180, http://mitpress.mit.edu/ISEC.
196. Waltz, "Structural Realism after the Cold War," p. 7.
197. An influential essay on this question is Mansfield and Snyder, "Democratization and the Danger of War."
198. See, for example, Maoz, "The Controversy over the Democratic Peace," pp. 162-198. An extensive collection of essays from IS, as well as other important contributions to the debate, is found in Michael E. Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller, eds., Debating the Democratic Peace (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press 1996). See also BCSIA's related volume, Miriam Fendius Elman, ed., Paths to Peace: Is Democracy the Answer? (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1997).
199. See, for example, Maoz, "The Controversy over the Democratic Peace," pp. 162-198. An extensive collection of essays from IS, as well as other important contributions to the debate, is found in Michael E. Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller, eds., Debating the Democratic Peace (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press 1996). See also BCSIA's related volume, Miriam Fendius Elman, ed., Paths to Peace: Is Democracy the Answer? (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1997).
200. See, for example, Maoz, "The Controversy over the Democratic Peace," pp. 162-198. An extensive collection of essays from IS, as well as other important contributions to the debate, is found in Michael E. Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller, eds., Debating the Democratic Peace (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press 1996). See also BCSIA's related volume, Miriam Fendius Elman, ed., Paths to Peace: Is Democracy the Answer? (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1997).
201. Illustrations from IS include Charles L. Glaser and Chaim Kaufmann, "What Is the Offense-Defense Balance and Can We Measure It?" International Security, Vol. 22, No. 4 (Spring 1998), pp 44-82; and Van Evera, "Offense, Defense, and the Causes of War," pp. 5-43; An early articulation of the argument that offense is dangerous is Stephen Van Evera, "The Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of the First World War," International Security, Vol. 9, No. 1 (Summer 1984), pp. 58-107. For skeptical views, see Keir A. Lieber, "Grasping the Technological Peace: The Offense-Defense Balance and International Security," International Security, Vol. 25, No. 1 (Summer 2000), pp 71-104; and James W. Davis, Jr., Bernard I. Finel, Stacie E. Goddard, Stephen Van Evera, and Charles L. Glaser and Chaim Kaufmann, "Correspondence: Taking Offense at Offense-Defense Theory," International Security, Vol. 23, No. 3 (Winter 1998/99), pp. 179-206. These and other works are collected in Michael E. Brown, Owen R. Coté, Jr., Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller, eds., Offense, Defense, and War (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, forthcoming).
202. Illustrations from IS include Charles L. Glaser and Chaim Kaufmann, "What Is the Offense-Defense Balance and Can We Measure It?" International Security, Vol. 22, No. 4 (Spring 1998), pp 44-82; and Van Evera, "Offense, Defense, and the Causes of War," pp. 5-43; An early articulation of the argument that offense is dangerous is Stephen Van Evera, "The Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of the First World War," International Security, Vol. 9, No. 1 (Summer 1984), pp. 58-107. For skeptical views, see Keir A. Lieber, "Grasping the Technological Peace: The Offense-Defense Balance and International Security," International Security, Vol. 25, No. 1 (Summer 2000), pp 71-104; and James W. Davis, Jr., Bernard I. Finel, Stacie E. Goddard, Stephen Van Evera, and Charles L. Glaser and Chaim Kaufmann, "Correspondence: Taking Offense at Offense-Defense
203. Illustrations from IS include Charles L. Glaser and Chaim Kaufmann, "What Is the Offense-Defense Balance and Can We Measure It?" International Security, Vol. 22, No. 4 (Spring 1998), pp 44-82; and Van Evera, "Offense, Defense, and the Causes of War," pp. 5-43; An early articulation of the argument that offense is dangerous is Stephen Van Evera, "The Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of the First World War," International Security, Vol. 9, No. 1 (Summer 1984), pp. 58-107. For skeptical views, see Keir A. Lieber, "Grasping the Technological Peace: The Offense-Defense Balance and International Security," International Security, Vol. 25, No. 1 (Summer 2000), pp 71-104; and James W. Davis, Jr., Bernard I. Finel, Stacie E. Goddard, Stephen Van Evera, and Charles L. Glaser and Chaim Kaufmann, "Correspondence: Taking Offense at Offense-Defense Theory," International Security, Vol. 23, No. 3 (Winter 1998/99), pp. 179-206. These and other works are collected in Michael E. Brown, Owen R. Coté, Jr., Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller, eds., Offense, Defense, and War (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, forthcoming).
204. Illustrations from IS include Charles L. Glaser and Chaim Kaufmann, "What Is the Offense-Defense Balance and Can We Measure It?" International Security, Vol. 22, No. 4 (Spring 1998), pp 44-82; and Van Evera, "Offense, Defense, and the Causes of War," pp. 5-43; An early articulation of the argument that offense is dangerous is Stephen Van Evera, "The Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of the First World War," International Security, Vol. 9, No. 1 (Summer 1984), pp. 58-107. For skeptical views, see Keir A. Lieber, "Grasping the Technological Peace: The Offense-Defense Balance and International Security," International Security, Vol. 25, No. 1 (Summer 2000), pp 71-104; and James W. Davis, Jr., Bernard I. Finel, Stacie E. Goddard, Stephen Van Evera, and Charles L. Glaser and Chaim Kaufmann, "Correspondence: Taking Offense at Offense-Defense Theory," International Security, Vol. 23, No. 3 (Winter 1998/99), pp. 179-206. These and other works are collected in Michael E. Brown, Owen R. Coté, Jr., Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller, eds., Offense, Defense, and War (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, forthcoming).
205. Illustrations from IS include Charles L. Glaser and Chaim Kaufmann, "What Is the Offense-Defense Balance and Can We Measure It?" International Security, Vol. 22, No. 4 (Spring 1998), pp 44-82; and Van Evera, "Offense, Defense, and the Causes of War," pp. 5-43; An early articulation of the argument that offense is dangerous is Stephen Van Evera, "The Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of the First World War," International Security, Vol. 9, No. 1 (Summer 1984), pp. 58-107. For skeptical views, see Keir A. Lieber, "Grasping the Technological Peace: The Offense-Defense Balance and International Security," International Security, Vol. 25, No. 1 (Summer 2000), pp 71-104; and James W. Davis, Jr., Bernard I. Finel, Stacie E. Goddard, Stephen Van Evera, and Charles L. Glaser and Chaim Kaufmann, "Correspondence: Taking Offense at Offense-Defense Theory," International Security, Vol. 23, No. 3 (Winter 1998/99), pp. 179-206. These and other works are collected in Michael E. Brown, Owen R. Coté, Jr., Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller, eds., Offense, Defense, and War (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, forthcoming).
206. Illustrations from IS include Charles L. Glaser and Chaim Kaufmann, "What Is the Offense-Defense Balance and Can We Measure It?" International Security, Vol. 22, No. 4 (Spring 1998), pp 44-82; and Van Evera, "Offense, Defense, and the Causes of War," pp. 5-43; An early articulation of the argument that offense is dangerous is Stephen Van Evera, "The Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of the First World War," International Security, Vol. 9, No. 1 (Summer 1984), pp. 58-107. For skeptical views, see Keir A. Lieber, "Grasping the Technological Peace: The Offense-Defense Balance and International Security," International Security, Vol. 25, No. 1 (Summer 2000), pp 71-104; and James W. Davis, Jr., Bernard I. Finel, Stacie E. Goddard, Stephen Van Evera, and Charles L. Glaser and Chaim Kaufmann, "Correspondence: Taking Offense at Offense-Defense Theory," International Security, Vol. 23, No. 3 (Winter 1998/99), pp. 179-206. These and other works are collected in Michael E. Brown, Owen R. Coté, Jr., Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller, eds., Offense, Defense, and War (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, forthcoming).
207. See Peter Liberman, "Trading with the Enemy: Security and Relative Economic Gains," International Security, Vol. 21, No. 1 (Summer 1996), pp. 147-175; John C. Matthews III, "Current Gains and Future Outcomes: When Cumulative Relative Gains Matter," ibid., pp. 112-146; and Michael Mastanduno, "Do Relative Gains Matter? America's Response to Japanese Industrial Policy," International Security, Vol. 16, No. 1 (Summer 1991), pp. 73-113.
208. See Peter Liberman, "Trading with the Enemy: Security and Relative Economic Gains," International Security, Vol. 21, No. 1 (Summer 1996), pp. 147-175; John C. Matthews III, "Current Gains and Future Outcomes: When Cumulative Relative Gains Matter," ibid., pp. 112-146; and Michael Mastanduno, "Do Relative Gains Matter? America's Response to Japanese Industrial Policy," International Security, Vol. 16, No. 1 (Summer 1991), pp. 73-113.
209. See Peter Liberman, "Trading with the Enemy: Security and Relative Economic Gains," International Security, Vol. 21, No. 1 (Summer 1996), pp. 147-175; John C. Matthews III, "Current Gains and Future Outcomes: When Cumulative Relative Gains Matter," ibid., pp. 112-146; and Michael Mastanduno, "Do Relative Gains Matter? America's Response to Japanese Industrial Policy," International Security, Vol. 16, No. 1 (Summer 1991), pp. 73-113.
210. Examples include Dale C. Copeland, "Economic Interdependence and War: A Theory of Trade Expectations," International Security, Vol. 20, No. 4 (Spring 1996), pp. 5-41; and Paul A. Papayoanou, "Interdependence, Institutions, and the Balance of Power: Britain, Germany, and World War I," ibid., pp. 42-76.
211. Examples include Dale C. Copeland, "Economic Interdependence and War: A Theory of Trade Expectations," International Security, Vol. 20, No. 4 (Spring 1996), pp. 5-41; and Paul A. Papayoanou, "Interdependence, Institutions, and the Balance of Power: Britain, Germany, and World War I," ibid., pp. 42-76.
212. See Ted Hopf, "The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory," International Security, Vol. 23, No. 1 (Summer 1998), pp. 171-200; Dale C. Copeland, "The Constructivist Challenge to Structural Realism: A Review Essay," International Security, Vol. 25, No. 2 (Fall 2000), pp. 187-212; and Alexander Wendt, "Constructing International Politics," International Security, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Summer 1995), pp. 71-81.
213. See Ted Hopf, "The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory," International Security, Vol. 23, No. 1 (Summer 1998), pp. 171-200; Dale C. Copeland, "The Constructivist Challenge to Structural Realism: A Review Essay," International Security, Vol. 25, No. 2 (Fall 2000), pp. 187-212; and Alexander Wendt, "Constructing International Politics," International Security, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Summer 1995), pp. 71-81.
214. See Ted Hopf, "The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory," International Security, Vol. 23, No. 1 (Summer 1998), pp. 171-200; Dale C. Copeland, "The Constructivist Challenge to Structural Realism: A Review Essay," International Security, Vol. 25, No. 2 (Fall 2000), pp. 187-212; and Alexander Wendt, "Constructing International Politics," International Security, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Summer 1995), pp. 71-81.
215. See, among others, John J. Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Winter 1993/94), pp. 5-49; Robert O. Keohane and Lisa L. Martin, "The Promise of Institutionalist Theory," International Security, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Summer 1995), pp. 39-51; John Gerard Ruggie, "The False Premise of Realism," ibid., pp. 62-70; and Lisa L. Martin, "Institutions and Cooperation: Sanctions during the Falkland Islands Conflict," International Security, Vol. 16, No. 4 (Spring 1992), pp. 143-178.
216. See, among others, John J. Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Winter 1993/94), pp. 5-49; Robert O. Keohane and Lisa L. Martin, "The Promise of Institutionalist Theory," International Security, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Summer 1995), pp. 39-51; John Gerard Ruggie, "The False Premise of Realism," ibid., pp. 62-70; and Lisa L. Martin, "Institutions and Cooperation: Sanctions during the Falkland Islands Conflict," International Security, Vol. 16, No. 4 (Spring 1992), pp. 143-178.
217. See, among others, John J. Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Winter 1993/94), pp. 5-49; Robert O. Keohane and Lisa L. Martin, "The Promise of Institutionalist Theory," International Security, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Summer 1995), pp. 39-51; John Gerard Ruggie, "The False Premise of Realism," ibid., pp. 62-70; and Lisa L. Martin, "Institutions and Cooperation: Sanctions during the Falkland Islands Conflict," International Security, Vol. 16, No. 4 (Spring 1992), pp. 143-178.
218. See, among others, John J. Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Winter 1993/94), pp. 5-49; Robert O. Keohane and Lisa L. Martin, "The Promise of Institutionalist Theory," International Security, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Summer 1995), pp. 39-51; John Gerard Ruggie, "The False Premise of Realism," ibid., pp. 62-70; and Lisa L. Martin, "Institutions and Cooperation: Sanctions during the Falkland Islands Conflict," International Security, Vol. 16, No. 4 (Spring 1992), pp. 143-178.
219. See for example, Stephen Peter Rosen, "Military Effectiveness: Why Society Matters, International Security, Vol. 19, No. 4 (Spring 1995), pp. 5-31; Elizabeth Kier, "Culture and Military Doctrine: France between the Wars," ibid., pp. 65-93; and Alastair Iain Johnston, "Thinking about Strategic Culture," ibid., pp. 32-64.
220. See for example, Stephen Peter Rosen, "Military Effectiveness: Why Society Matters, International Security, Vol. 19, No. 4 (Spring 1995), pp. 5-31; Elizabeth Kier, "Culture and Military Doctrine: France between the Wars," ibid., pp. 65-93; and Alastair Iain Johnston, "Thinking about Strategic Culture," ibid., pp. 32-64.
221. See for example, Stephen Peter Rosen, "Military Effectiveness: Why Society Matters, International Security, Vol. 19, No. 4 (Spring 1995), pp. 5-31; Elizabeth Kier, "Culture and Military Doctrine: France between the Wars," ibid., pp. 65-93; and Alastair Iain Johnston, "Thinking about Strategic Culture," ibid., pp. 32-64.
222. The quotes are from Stephen H. Haber, David M. Kennedy, and Stephen D. Krasner, "Brothers under the Skin: Diplomatic History and International Relations," International Security, Vol. 22, No. 1 (Summer 1997), p. 34; Edward Ingram, "The Wonderland of the Political Scientist," ibid., p. 53; and John Lewis Gaddis, "History, Theory, and Common Ground," ibid., p. 75.
223. The quotes are from Stephen H. Haber, David M. Kennedy, and Stephen D. Krasner, "Brothers under the Skin: Diplomatic History and International Relations," International Security, Vol. 22, No. 1 (Summer 1997), p. 34; Edward Ingram, "The Wonderland of the Political Scientist," ibid., p. 53; and John Lewis Gaddis, "History, Theory, and Common Ground," ibid., p. 75.
224. The quotes are from Stephen H. Haber, David M. Kennedy, and Stephen D. Krasner, "Brothers under the Skin: Diplomatic History and International Relations," International Security, Vol. 22, No. 1 (Summer 1997), p. 34; Edward Ingram, "The Wonderland of the Political Scientist," ibid., p. 53; and John Lewis Gaddis, "History, Theory, and Common Ground," ibid., p. 75.
225. See in particular the introductory essay by Colin Elman and Miriam Fendius Elman, "Diplomatic History and International Relations Theory: Respecting Difference and Crossing Boundaries," ibid., pp. 5-21. These themes are developed further in Colin Elman and Miriam Fendius Elman, eels., Bridges and Boundaries: Historians, Political Scientists, and the Study of International Relations (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2001).
226. See in particular the introductory essay by Colin Elman and Miriam Fendius Elman, "Diplomatic History and International Relations Theory: Respecting Difference and Crossing Boundaries," ibid., pp. 5-21. These themes are developed further in Colin Elman and Miriam Fendius Elman, eels., Bridges and Boundaries: Historians, Political Scientists, and the Study of International Relations (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2001).
227. Stephen M. Walt, "Rigor or Rigor Mortis? Rational Choice and Security Studies," International Security, Vol. 23, No. 4 (Spring 1999), pp. 5-48.
228. The debate between Walt and the proponents of rational choice is collected in Michael E. Brown, Owen R. Coté, Jr., Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller, Rational Choice and Security Studies: Stephen Walt and His Critics (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2000).
229. Michael Howard, The Invention of Peace: Reflections on War and International Order (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2001), p. 1.
230. Charles Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990-1990 (Cambridge, Mass.: Basil Blackwell, 1990), pp. 74, 70 (emphasis in original).